Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 3

Article 4

2020

Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act
Robert G. Schwemm

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert G. Schwemm, Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act, 70 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev.
573 (2020)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol70/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020

Source-of-Income Discrimination
and the Fair Housing Act
Robert G. Schwemm†
Abstract
Amending the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) to ban “sourceof-income” discrimination has been discussed for over twenty years.
During this time, a growing number of states and localities (including
many of the nation’s largest cities) have taken this step by amending
their fair housing laws to prohibit discrimination against Section 8
voucher holders and others based on their source of income. Meanwhile,
bills proposing such an amendment to the FHA have regularly been
introduced, including four in the current Congress.
Proponents of such an amendment say it would help fulfill the
voucher program’s goal of providing low-income families with a wider
choice of housing and eliminate a form of discrimination that has
frustrated the FHA’s goals of ending racial discrimination and
segregation. The refusal of many landlords to rent to people who rely
on vouchers or other government assistance programs has undercut the
ability of these programs to extend opportunities outside areas of
minority concentration. Further, much of today’s racial segregation
reflects economic segregation, and a crucial part of FHA litigation has
always involved disputes over locating affordable housing projects in
affluent white areas.
What if the FHA were amended to ban source-of-income
discrimination? The most obvious result, as experience shows in states
and localities that have taken this step, would be a substantial rise in
litigation against landlords who continue to engage in such disc–
rimination. Another likely area of increased litigation would be
challenges to exclusionary zoning and other municipal practices that
block affordable housing. A variety of other practices might also be
challenged under an amended FHA.
This Article reviews the experience of states and localities that have
banned source-of-income discrimination in housing and then
contemplates how the FHA, if amended to add this protected class,
would work. Part I provides the legal background by describing the
FHA, the Section 8 program, and the state and local laws that now ban
source-of-income discrimination. Part II explores cases that have
challenged source-of-income discrimination, first under these local laws
and then under the FHA’s disparate-impact and other theories of
liability. After Part III’s review of the arguments for and against a
†

Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, University of Kentucky
College of Law.
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source-of-income amendment to the FHA, Part IV examines the various
types of claims that might arise if such an amendment were enacted.
The Article concludes that a source-of-income amendment, though
not a panacea, would be an important step forward in helping the FHA
achieve its core missions of reducing segregation and ending arbitrary
limits on housing choice.
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Introduction
Over twenty years ago, a law review note that called for an
amendment to the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) 1 described source-ofincome discrimination as the “New Frontier” of fair-housing law.2 At
that time, a few states and localities had banned housing discrimination
against Section 8 voucher holders3 and others based on their sources of
income.4 Today, seventeen states and over seventy localities, including
many of the nation’s largest cities, have taken this step.5 Meanwhile,
bills proposing such an amendment to the FHA have regularly been
introduced,6 including three that are pending in the current Congress.7
Proponents of such an amendment say it would help fulfill the
federal voucher program’s goal of providing low-income families with
more housing choices and would eliminate a form of discrimination that
has frustrated the FHA’s goals of ending both racially segregated
housing patterns and discrimination against certain minorities.8 The
1.

Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–19, 82 Stat. 73, 81–
89 (1968). The FHA, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19
(2012).

2.

See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing
Act’s New Frontier, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 155, 160 (1996).

3.

For a description of the Section 8 voucher program, see infra Part I.B.

4.

See Beck, supra note 2, at 168 nn.81–85, 169 n.86 and accompanying text
(noting that Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Vermont, Utah, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia
had such laws); see also infra app. II (identifying, in addition to the
District of Columbia, some of the localities that had such laws at that
time, such as Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Montgomery
County, Maryland).

5.

See infra app. I (listing states), app. II (listing major localities).

6.

See infra app. III (“Before 2019”).

7.

See id. (“2019”). The non-discrimination provisions of these bills focus
exclusively on housing. Meanwhile, on May 17, 2019, the House passed a
wide-ranging civil rights bill that bans discrimination based on, inter alia,
sexual orientation, gender identity, and sex-based stereotypes in
employment, housing, public accommodations, public facilities, public
education, and federally funded activities, by amending various existing
statutes including the FHA. See Equality Act of 2019, H.R. 5, 116th Cong.
(2019); see also Catie Edmondson, Civil Rights Bill Advances But Is
Unlikely to Get Far, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2019, at A15 (noting that the
likely response to this bill from the Republican-controlled Senate and
White House is “a resounding no”).

8.

See infra note 87 and accompanying text (voucher program), infra Part
IV.B (FHA).
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refusal of many landlords to rent to people who rely on vouchers or
other government assistance programs has undercut the ability of these
programs to extend opportunities outside areas of minority concen–
tration. Further, much of today’s racial segregation reflects economic
segregation, and a crucial part of FHA litigation has always involved
disputes over locating affordable housing projects in affluent white
areas.9
A note about the difference between “income” and “source-ofincome” discrimination: the former deals with “how much,” while the
latter deals with “where from.” Income-based discrimination has
consistently been viewed as compatible with the FHA, as confirmed by
the statute’s legislative history.10 Thus, landlords and other housing
providers in FHA cases have always been perceived as having a
legitimate interest in their tenants’ ability to pay the rent or to meet
other financial obligations (e.g., to secure protection against default,
property damage, etc.).11 Where this income comes from, however, is a
different matter (e.g., wages, investments, trusts, government
assistance, etc.). In theory, a tenant’s source of income should not
matter to a landlord, so long as that income is reasonably likely to
continue and does not impose on the landlord other risks or hardships.12
What if the FHA were amended to ban source-of-income
discrimination? The most obvious result, as cases from states and
localities that have taken this step show, would be a substantial rise in
litigation against private landlords who continue to engage in such
discrimination.13 Another likely area of increased litigation would be
9.

See infra Part IV.B. Early cases involving such disputes include
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283, 1288–94 (7th Cir. 1977), and United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974). Recent cases include Mhany
Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617–19 (2d Cir.
2016), and Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493,
496 (9th Cir. 2016).

10.

See, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 3,421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale (the
FHA’s chief sponsor)) (“[T]he basic purpose of this legislation is to permit
people who have the ability to do so to buy any house offered to the public
if they can afford to buy it. It would not overcome the economic problem
of those who could not afford to purchase the house of their choice.”).

11.

See infra notes 224, 381, 386 and accompanying text; see also Robert
G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation § 10:2
n.5 (2019) (gathering cases that note the FHA’s lack of a bar against
economic discrimination). A separate issue is whether a landlord may
require a certain minimum ratio of income to rent (e.g., that a tenant
have wages or other income equal to at least three times the rent). See
infra Part IV.G.2.

12.

See infra notes 213, 224.

13.

See infra Part IV.A.
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challenges to exclusionary zoning and other municipal practices that
block affordable housing.14 Beyond these types of suits, litigation under
an amended FHA might include a variety of other scenarios.15
This Article reviews the experience of states and localities that have
banned source-of-income discrimination in housing. It then contem–
plates how the FHA would work if it were amended to add this
protected class. Part I begins with the legal background, describing the
FHA, the Section 8 program, and their goals and experiences, followed
by a review of the state and local laws that now include source-ofincome among their prohibited bases of discrimination. Part II then
explores cases that have alleged source-of-income discrimination, first
under these state and local laws, and then under the FHA’s “impact”
theory of liability. Part III considers the arguments for and against
amending the FHA to ban source-of-income discrimination. Finally,
Part IV examines the various types of claims that might arise if the
FHA were so amended.

I. Legal Background
A. The Fair Housing Act

The current FHA prohibits discrimination in most housing and
housing-related transactions based on seven factors 16 : race, color,
national origin, and religion were included in the original statute in
1968;17 sex was added in 1974;18 and handicap (disability) and families
with children were added by the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments.19 The
statute also bars conduct that interferes with the FHA’s substantive
rights, as well as retaliation for asserting those rights. 20 The FHA
authorizes three separate methods of enforcement: private suits; admin–
istrative complaints to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”); and Justice Department actions. It provides for
remedies that include uncapped actual and punitive damages, civil
penalties, and attorney’s fees,21 making its enforcement scheme among
the strongest of all U.S. civil rights laws. In addition, the FHA
mandates that HUD and other federal agencies administer their housing
14.

See infra Part IV.B.

15.

See infra Part IV.C–F.

16.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603–07, 3617 (2012).

17.

See Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).

18.

See Pub. L. No. 93-383 § 808(b), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1974).

19.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–06 (2012).

20.

See id. § 3617; 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5) (2018); Schwemm, supra note
11, § 20.

21.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–14 (2012).
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programs in a manner that actively furthers fair housing,22 although
this provision does not provide for private enforcement.23
The FHA has also fostered the development of many state and local
fair-housing laws and agencies, in part through its requirement that
complaints to HUD be referred to these agencies.24 Over fifty localities
and thirty-five states now have laws that are substantially equivalent
to the FHA. 25 And many go farther in that they have narrower
exemptions or additional protected classes, 26 both of which are
specifically authorized by the FHA.27
The original FHA sought to eliminate private and public practices
that had for decades confined African-Americans to segregated, ghettolike neighborhoods. The FHA was passed in the wake of racial violence
in many urban areas,28 which led the Kerner Commission to conclude
that America was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—
separate and unequal,” and to call for a national open-housing law.29
The Senate responded in early 1968 by passing a fair-housing bill that
was intended, according to its principal sponsor Senator Mondale, to
replace “the ghetto . . . [with] truly integrated and balanced living
patterns.”30 Shortly after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
22.

See id. § 3608; Schwemm, supra note 11, § 21:1 & nn.2–3; see also infra
note 308 and accompanying text.

23.

See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 21:7 & n.6.

24.

See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (2012).

25.

For a list of these states and localities, see Schwemm, supra note 11, at
app. C.

26.

For examples of those that go beyond the FHA, see Schwemm, supra note
11, §§ 30:2 & nn.1–2, 30:3.

27.

See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to invalidate or limit any law of a State or political subdivision
of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in which this subchapter shall be
effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are
granted by this subchapter”); see also 24 C.F.R. § 115.204(h) (2018)
(providing, in HUD regulations, that a state or local law’s protection of
additional prohibited bases does not mean that that law is not
substantially equivalent to the FHA for the purposes of justifying referrals
of FHA-agency complaints).

28.

See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2015) (noting that the FHA was passed in response
to Martin Luther King’s assassination and the “new urgency” “the Nation
faced . . . to resolve the social unrest in the inner cities”).

29.

See id. at 2525–26 (quoting Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Civil
Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders 1 (1968)).

30.

114 Cong. Rec. 3,422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale); see also id.
(“[T]he best way for this Congress to start on the true road to integration
is by enacting fair housing legislation.”).
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Jr., the House agreed to this bill, and President Johnson signed it into
law on April 11, 1968.31
Courts have interpreted the FHA broadly in accordance with its
remedial purposes. In its first review of the statute in 1972 in the
Trafficante case,32 the Supreme Court noted the FHA’s pro-integration
goal and concluded that FHA violations hurt not only their minority
targets, but also a broader community that, in this case, included
residents of a large apartment complex whose landlord’s anti-black
discrimination allegedly blocked the complex’s integration.33 Traffic–
ante was quickly followed by two other decisions that recognized FHA
standing for other types of plaintiffs (e.g., municipalities and fairhousing organizations).34 In 2017, the Court re-affirmed these decisions
in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami.35 Two years earlier, in
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 36 the Court recognized that the FHA
includes a disparate-impact standard of liability. 37 The Court again
underscored the FHA’s mission of fostering integration38 and the Act’s
important “role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated
society.”39 Also, to the extent that lower courts had interpreted the
FHA broadly by the time of the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act,

31.

See 114 Cong. Rec. 9,620–21 (1968) (House passage); see also Lyndon
B. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson 509–10 (1970) (remarking upon signing
the Act).

32.

Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).

33.

Id. at 211 (noting that the FHA was designed to “replace the ghettos”
with integrated housing patterns and that the Act aimed to protect not
only direct victims of housing discrimination but “the whole community”)
(quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 3,422 (statement of Sen. Mondale) (1968)); id.
at 2,706 (statement of Sen. Javits).

34.

See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–11 (1979). Also,
in the 1970s and 1980s, lower courts regularly upheld housing developers’
standing to allege FHA violations by municipalities that blocked the
developers’ proposals for affordable housing projects. See, e.g.,
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 393–
95 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 12A:3 n.6
(gathering cases).

35.

See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017).

36.

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).

37.

Id. at 2525.

38.

See id. at 2521–22, 2525–26.

39.

Id. at 2526.
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the Court in both City of Miami and Inclusive Communities held that
the 1988 Congress intended to endorse these broad interpretations.40
Still, fifty years after the enactment of the FHA, severe racial
segregation continues to characterize much of America’s housing. Using
the 100-point dissimilarity index as a measure (with 100 indicating total
segregation and 0 indicating a randomly distributed population by
race), census figures show that the black–white segregation score for all
of the nation’s metropolitan areas in 1970 was 79; 73 in 1980; 67 in
1990; 64 in 2000; and 59 in 2010.41 Thus, while some progress has been
made over the FHA’s fifty years, the pace of change has been extremely
slow.42 The pace has also varied greatly across the country: in 2010,
New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Miami all
remained in the 70-80 range, and Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and
Baltimore scored around 65,43 while some western metropolitan areas
had scores of under 40.44 Also, the rise in “minority suburbanization”

40.

See City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1303–04; Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at
2519–20.

41.

See John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of
Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010
Census 4 (2011). For Latinos and Asians, comparable figures in the 1970–
2010 period were about 50 and 41, respectively. Id. at 10, 17. Dissimilarity
values “of at least 60 are considered high and those of at least 70 are
considered extreme.” William H. Frey, The New Metro Minority
Map: Regional Shifts in Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks from
Census 2010, at 3 (2011).

42.

See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 Am. Soc. Rev. 629, 629 (2010)
(“[D]ecades after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, residential
segregation remains a key feature of America’s urban landscape. . . . In
areas with large African American communities—places such as New
York, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Houston, and Washington—the declines
have been minimal or nonexistent”) (citation omitted).

43.

See Logan & Stults, supra note 41, at 6; see also Paul A. Jargowsky,
The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st Century, 36 L. & Ineq. J. 207,
214 (2018) (providing 2010 indices of black–white dissimilarity for the twenty
largest metropolitan areas). Based on 2013–17 data, the five most racially
segregated cities—all with numbers well above 70—were, in order: Milwaukee,
New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland. See William H. Frey, Black–
White Segregation Edges Downward since 2000, Census Shows, Brookings
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue [https:/
/perma.cc/CSG9-YAXZ]. As for Latino–white segregation, many major
cities had dissimilarity indices in the 57–64 range, including New York,
Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia. See Logan & Stults, supra
note 41, at 12.

44.

See Logan & Stults, supra note 41, at 7; Frey, supra note 41, at 14;
see also Richard Sander, The Opportunity and the Danger of the New
Urban Migration, 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 871, 884–87 (2019) (identifying
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over the life of the FHA—minorities now constitute about one-third of
the suburban population in the nation’s largest metropolitan areas—
may just mean that minorities have mainly been “re-segregated in
separate communities within the suburbs.”45 Thus, as Senator Mondale
recently noted: “The evil of residential segregation has waned at some
times and in some places, but in others . . . , segregation has only
grown.”46
What’s more, today’s racially impacted neighborhoods are in some
ways even worse than those that existed in 1968. For one thing,
predominantly black areas now tend also to be predominantly poor;47
many of the upper- and middle-class black families who were confined
to racial ghettos by blatant forms of discrimination before 1968 have
moved elsewhere, leaving the current residents without professional
services, role-models, and other advantages of a mixed-income neigh–
borhood. As a result, today’s heavily black and poor areas are beset by

factors that led to greater black–white integration in western cities as
compared to northern cities).
45.

William H. Frey, Ctr. on Urban & Metro. Pol’y, Melting Pot
Suburbs: A Census 2000 Study of Suburban Diversity 13 (2001);
see also Myron Orfield & William Stancil, The Summit for Civil Rights:
Mission, Structure, and Initial Outcomes, 36 L. & Ineq. J. 191, 195
(2018) (describing the suburbanization of people of color as revealed by
the 2010 census).

46.

Walter F. Mondale, The Civil Rights Law We Ignored, N.Y. Times (Apr.
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/opinion/walter-mondalefair-housing-act.html [https://perma.cc/4LLY-CAH9].

47.

See Kendra Bischoff & Sean F. Reardon, Residential Segregation by
Income, 1970–2009, in Diversity and Disparities 208, 215, 225 (John
R. Logan ed., 2013) (finding that “segregation of families by socioeconomic
status has grown significantly in the last forty years” and that incomesegregation trends “among black and Hispanic families are much more
striking than those among white families,” with income segregation among
black families in 2009 being “65 percent greater than among white
families”).
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myriad problems, including poor air and water quality,48 lower-quality food
and health services,49 shorter life expectancies,50 limited access to credit,51

48.

See, e.g., Ihab Mikati et al., Disparities in Distribution of Particulate
Matter Emission Sources by Race and Poverty Status, 108 Am. J. Pub.
Health 480 (2018) (finding in an EPA study that, in forty-six states,
communities of color are exposed to dangerous pollution at higher levels
than white communities); Peter Christensen & Christopher Timmins,
Sorting or Steering: Experimental Evidence on the Economic Effects of
Housing Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
24826, 2018) (noting correlations between minority neighborhoods and
pollution, particularly at Superfund sites).

49.

See, e.g., Mariana C. Arcaya & Alina Schnake-Mahl, Health in the Segregated
City, in The Dream Revisited: Contemporary Debates About
Housing, Segregation, and Opportunity in the Twenty-First
Century 165 (Ingrid Gould Ellen & Justin Peter Steil eds., 2019) (concluding
that “poor, predominantly minority neighborhoods experience . . . worse
outcomes on a range of health measures”); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health
and Housing: Altruistic Medicalization of America’s Affordability Crisis,
81 L. & Contemp. Probs. 161, 167–70 (2018) (reviewing research
establishing links between residential segregation and adverse health
outcomes); Kelly M. Bower et al., The Intersection of Neighborhood
Racial Segregation, Poverty, and Urbanicity and its Impact on Food Store
Availability in the United States, 58 Prev. Med. 33 (2014) (finding that
“living in an impoverished and a segregated black neighborhood presents
a double disadvantage in access to high quality foods [such as] . . . fresh
fruit, vegetables, low-fat milk, and high-fiber foods” ); see also John
Eligon et al., Black Americans Bear the Brunt As Virus Spreads, N.Y.
Times, April 8, 2020, at A2 (reporting that the coronavirus "is infecting
and killing black people in the United States at disproportionately high
rates . . . , highlighting what public health officials say are entrenched
inequalities in resources, health and access to care”).

50.

See, e.g., Imogene Francis, Life Expectancy Gaps in US Cities Linked to
Racial Segregation: Study, Globe Post Newsletter (June 13, 2019),
https://theglobepost.com/2019/06/13/life-expectancy-racial-segregation/
[https://perma.cc/9NA7-V6S9] (reporting on a New York University
School of Medicine study that showed the gap between white and black
life expectancies can differ between ten and thirty years in the nation’s
largest cities, with the gap being “widest in cities with extreme segregation”);
Arcaya & Schnake-Mahl, supra note 49 (concluding that “poor,
predominantly minority neighborhoods experience disproportionately high
mortality rates”); N. Cambria et al., Segregation in St. Louis:
Dismantling the Divide 5 (2018) (noting the eighteen-year lifeexpectancy gap at birth between two zip codes in the St. Louis area less
than ten miles apart—one heavily black, one heavily white).

51.

See, e.g., Rugh & Massey, supra note 42, at 632–33; see also Bank of Am.
Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–02 (2017).
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inferior schools,52 poor transportation and other public services,53 and
fewer opportunities associated with a good life.54
Why has the FHA failed to reduce America’s racially segregated
housing patterns? Part of the reason is that residential segregation has
causes other than discrimination—such as economic differences55—and
thus ending racial discrimination does not automatically result in
integration.56 But it is also true that the types of discrimination that

52.

See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg et al., Civil Rights Project,
Harming our Common Future: America’s Segregated Schools 65
Years after Brown 4 (2019); John R. Logan & Julia Burdick-Will,
School Segregation and Disparities in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Areas,
672 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 185 (2017); Sean F. Reardon,
School Segregation and Racial Academic Achievement Gaps, 2 Russell
Sage Found. J. Soc. Sci. 34 (2016).

53.

See, e.g., Partnership for Southern Equity, Opportunity Deferred:
Race, Transportation, and the Future of Metropolitan Atlanta
(2016); Brian S. McKenzie, Neighborhood Access to Transit by Race,
Ethnicity, and Poverty in Portland, OR, 12 City & Community 134, 135
(2013); Jeffrey A. Fagan, Policing and Segregation, in The Dream
Revisited, supra note 49, at 153, 154–55.

54.

See generally Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration:
The Past and Future of Fair Housing 407–08 (2018) (noting that
research shows housing integration is a powerful engine for reducing
various forms of racial inequality). As Senator Mondale recently wrote,
the approach of trying “to fix segregated neighborhoods without
integrating them . . . has always failed . . . . We know even more clearly
than in 1968 that integration is the clearest path for non-white families
to acquire a foothold in the American education and economic system.”
Walter F. Mondale, Afterword to The Fight for Fair Housing:
Causes, Consequences, and Future Implications of the 1968 Fair
Housing Act 295 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2018).

55.

See, e.g., William H. Frey & Dowell Myers, U. of Mich.
Population Stud. Ctr., Racial Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas and Cities, 1990–2000: Patterns, Trends, and Explanations
22 (2005) (concluding that the black–white dissimilarity levels reflected
in the 2000 census are “significantly affected, most, by the relative
household incomes of Blacks versus Whites”).

56.

See Logan & Stults, supra note 41, at 21 (identifying reasons beyond
economic differences for the persistence of black–white segregation and
concluding that “[p]art of the answer is that systematic discrimination in
the housing market has not ended”). That economic differences account
for only part of the answer is demonstrated by the fact that “minorities
at every income level live in poorer neighborhoods than do whites with
comparable incomes.” John R. Logan, US2010 Project, Separate
and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians in Metropolitan America 1 (2011) (finding that the “disparity
between black and white neighborhood poverty in a metropolitan area is
hardly related to blacks’ average income levels [and] racial segregation is
a very strong predictor of unequal neighborhoods”).
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the FHA condemns continue at discouragingly high levels. Although
those levels have diminished since 1968,57 more needs to be done.
B. The Housing Choice Voucher Program (“Section 8”)

The Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”) program is the federal
government’s largest housing subsidy program, serving over 2.2 million
low-income households comprising some 5.3 million individuals. 58
Created by the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act,59 the
program is sometimes called “Section 8” after the provision in that
statute authorizing it.60
Actually, Section 8 has two components: “tenant-based” assistance,
which provides vouchers to low-income renters, and “project-based”
assistance, which provides subsidies to owners of low-income
apartments. 61 Under both the tenant- and project-based programs,
57.

See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner et al., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., Housing Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic
Minorities 2012, at 5 (2013) (finding that, in the most recent of HUD’s
four national-tester-based studies, minority home-seekers are still often
“told about and shown fewer homes and apartment than [comparable]
whites”). For a description of the levels of rental and sales discrimination
found in these four HUD studies, see Schwemm, supra note 11, § 2:4.

58.

See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., New Picture of Subsidized
Housing Fact Sheet (June 8, 2018), http://www.huduser.gov/portal/elist/
2018-june_08.html [https://perma.cc/XU7K-NQ2B] [hereinafter New Picture]
(reporting that in 2016, the HCV program had funding for 2,474,400 units,
93% of which were occupied by 5,350,188 individuals).
The HCV program assists more families than the other two major federal
rental-assistance programs combined: public housing has about one
million units serving over two million residents; project-based rental
assistance has about 1.3 million units serving some two million residents.
See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2017 Office of Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity Annual Report to Congress 66
(2018) [hereinafter 2017 HUD Report] (reporting that, in the eighteenmonth period ending September 30, 2017, there were 2,215,224 households
assisted by tenant-based vouchers and 982,752 assisted by public
housing); infra note 61 (providing comparable figures for the project-based
rental program).

59.

Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f (2012)); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2018) (providing an overview
of the HCV program).

60.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(D) (2012). Although the name was eventually
changed to the Housing Choice Voucher program, see infra note 80, courts
often still refer to it as the “Section 8” program. See, e.g., Hayes v.
Harvey, 903 F.3d 32, 40 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc).

61.

See Hayes, 903 F.3d at 36 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(6)–(7) (2012); 24
C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(1) (2018)) (describing both the tenant- and projectbased programs). A project-based owner enters into a long-term contract
with the local public housing agency (“PHA”), under which the owner
agrees to rent its property to eligible low-income families and the PHA
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assisted families contribute a prescribed amount toward their rental
payments62 with the government paying the balance up to a statutorily
capped amount.63
The basic features of the tenant-based voucher program have
remained the same over the years. 64 HUD funds the program and
administers it through roughly 2100 local public housing agencies
(“PHAs”) with which HUD contracts.65 Based on local-market data and
statutory caps, HUD sets basic rent levels (“payment standards”) for

agrees to provide HUD-funded rental-assistance payments to the owner
on the assisted tenants’ behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (2012); 24 C.F.R.
§§ 983.202, .205 (2018). The owner then enters into written leases with
particular families for individual units. See 24 C.F.R. § 983.256 (2018);
24 C.F.R. § 982.308(b) (1998). In 2019, there were 17,335 project-based
Section 8 properties comprising about 1.3 million units and 2 million
people. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Contract
Renewal Information—All Contracts (2019), available at
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/contractrenewaal
lcontracts.zip [https://perma.cc/8VTJ-2JRM]; see also supra note 58.
The project-based program and the housing units it subsidizes are subject
to the FHA’s nondiscrimination commands and other applicable civil
rights laws. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.53 (2018); see, e.g., Gresham v.
Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1422 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a Section 8 project-based landlord violated the FHA by failing to
comply with certain HUD subsidized-housing regulations). Project-based
developments have been involved in a good deal of FHA litigation,
including a number of challenges to local governments’ efforts to block
such developments. See, e.g., Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 857–
65 (E.D. Va. 1982); United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp.
819, 822 (E.D. Mich. 1982); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing FHA
exclusionary-land-use cases).
62.

42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) (2012); see also id. § 1437a(a)(1).

63.

See id. § 1437f(c), (o)(1)–(2); Hayes, 903 F.3d at 36–37.

64.

See, e.g., Stacy Seicshnaydre et al., Missing Opportunity: Furthering Fair
Housing in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 79 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 173, 174–84 (2016) (describing the HCV program’s structure and
purposes).

65.

24 C.F.R. § 982.151(a)(1) (2018). Local PHAs administer the program in
accordance with a formal administrative plan that must both conform to
HUD regulations and rely on HUD-established rent levels. See infra note
66 and accompanying text.
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each area (known as “Fair Market Rents” or “FMRs”),66 and voucher
holders rent units that fall within these FMRs.67
Low-income families apply for a voucher from their local PHA,
which screens them for income and other eligibility requirements.68 For
those who qualify, the PHA issues a voucher,69 or, more likely, puts
them on a waiting list.70 Once a family is selected, the PHA provides
them with program information that includes “a list of landlords [or
other parties] known to the PHA who may be willing to lease a unit to
66.

See 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(a)(1) (2018). The local PHA adopts a schedule
that sets voucher-payment-standard amounts per unit size for each FMR
area in its jurisdiction. The payment standards are designed to cover the
prevailing rent levels for all but the top end of the rental market and are
between 90% and 110% of the relevant FMR. The amount of rent that a
voucher family must pay is generally no more than 30% of the family’s
adjusted income. See id. §§ 982.503, .505, .515.
Until recently, HUD calculated FMRs using rent levels for entire
metropolitan areas or other large jurisdictions. This meant that an area’s
FMR might not accurately reflect rents in the area’s higher-cost
submarkets, which often resulted in payment standards being too low for
“voucher holders to afford rents in high-rent, high-opportunity
neighborhoods, consigning them to low-opportunity areas of concentrated
poverty.” See Open Cmtys. Alliance v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148, 154
(D.D.C. 2017); see also Seicshnaydre et al., supra note 64, at 175 (noting
that HUD’s “creation of a single-voucher payment standard for an entire
region . . . steered voucher families to the lowest-cost neighborhoods”).
“HUD recognized the shortcomings of FMR schedules . . . as early as
1977.” Open Cmtys. Alliance, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 155 n.2. Thus, it began
to address the problem in 2010 by considering the use of smaller-area
FMRs (“SAFMRs”), and it eventually adopted a rule in 2016 that
required PHAs in twenty-four major metropolitan areas to use SAFRMs.
See id. at 152–59. The Trump Administration tried to suspend this rule
in 2017, but that effort was enjoined for violating the Administrative
Procedure Act, see id. at 161-79, and thus HUD's new SAFRM rule went
into effect as scheduled in 2018.

67.

See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Housing Choice Vouchers Fact
Sheet, https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_
section_8 [https://perma.cc/JBA5-QNZZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). A
family may lease an apartment for more than this standard, but PHA
assistance cannot exceed the standard; if rent exceeds the standard, the
family must pay the difference.

68.

The selection criteria are set forth in HUD regulations and in the PHA’s
administrative plan. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.151(a)(1) (2018). Eligibility for
the HCV program depends primarily on household income. HUD’s income
limits are set based on the number of persons in the applicant household.
See generally U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 67.

69.

See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 67; 24 C.F.R.
§§ 982.202, .302 (2018).

70.

See New Picture, supra note 58 (noting that the average family receiving
a voucher spent thirty months on a waiting list).
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the family or . . . assist the family in locating a unit.”71 A family with
a voucher then seeks housing on its own, generally paying no more than
30% of its income for rent, with the PHA paying the remainder to the
landlord with HUD funds.72 Vouchers are good for at least sixty days
(and may be renewed),73 and they are “portable,” which means they
may be used anywhere in the country, so long as the rental unit chosen
is in the jurisdiction of a PHA that administers a HCV program.74
In the voucher program, as in the non-subsidized market, landlords
are responsible for screening prospective tenants,75 and they may use
their regular selection criteria. 76 Once an assisted family finds an
appropriate unit and a landlord willing to rent to them, the local PHA
must approve the tenancy. To approve it, the PHA first must inspect
the apartment and determine that the rent and lease terms conform to
the program’s requirements.77 The PHA then enters into a contract
with the property owner that specifies payment amounts and other

71.

24 C.F.R. § 982.301(b)(11) (2018).

72.

See id. §§ 982.1(a)(3), .503(b); see also U.S. Dep’t of Housing &
Urban Dev., supra note 67 (providing general rules and exceptions).

73.

See 24 C.F.R. § 982.303 (2018).

74.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(7) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b) (2012). For more
on the portability of vouchers, see Housing Choice Voucher Program:
Streamlining the Portability Process, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,564 (Aug. 20, 2015),
as amended, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,619 (Sept. 2, 2015); U.S. Dep’t of Housing
& Urban Dev., Notice PIH 2016-09(HA), Housing Choice Voucher
(HCV) Family Moves with Continued Assistance, Family Briefing,
and Voucher Term’s Suspension 4 (2016).

75.

See 24 C.F.R. § 982.307(a)(2) (2018). Under HUD regulations that give
the landlord responsibility for screening prospective HCV tenants, the
landlord may consider a family’s background and tenancy history with
respect to payment of rent and utility bills, caring for the apartment,
respecting the rights of other residents, drug-related or other criminal
activity, and compliance with other essential tenancy conditions. Id.
§ 982.307(a)(3).

76.

See id. § 982.308(b)(2).

77.

See id. §§ 982.302(b), .405. In order to approve the tenancy, the PHA
must determine: 1) after an inspection of the apartment, that it meets the
housing-quality standards established by HUD in 24 C.F.R. § 982.401
(2018); 2) that the rent is reasonable, as defined by HUD’s guidelines set
forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.507 (2018); and 3) that the lease conforms to
HUD requirements.
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terms.78 The property owner also enters into a written lease with the
assisted family.79
Congress made some changes to the Section 8 voucher program
during the 1980s and 1990s.80 For present purposes, the most significant
was a 1987 provision mandating that landlords who participated in the
program could not discriminate against other tenants who used
vouchers (the so-called “Take One, Take All” requirement). 81 This
requirement ultimately came to be seen as discouraging landlords from
participating in the HCV program, and Congress repealed it in 1998.82
Thereafter, landlord-participation in the program was seen as
“voluntary.”83

78.

24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(2) (2018); see also Montgomery Cty. v. Glenmont
Hills, 936 A.2d 325, 328–30 (Md. 2007). This contract covers only the
single unit and the particular assisted family involved, and it may be for
a term as short as one year. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.1(b)(2), .309(a) (2018).

79.

24 C.F.R. § 982.308(b) (2018). The lease must be either the standard
lease used by the landlord for non-assisted tenants or a model lease
prepared by HUD, and it must include a HUD-prepared addendum that
sets forth certain rights of the tenant and landlord. See id. §§ 982.162(a)(3),
.308(b)–(f).

80.

See, e.g., Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (merging the certificate and voucher programs
and changing “Section 8” to “HCV”); see also infra note 81 and
accompanying text. See generally Alex F. Schwartz, Housing Policy
in the United States 227–37 (3d ed. 2015) (describing the Section 8
program’s evolution).

81.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (1988) (barring affected apartment
owners from refusing “to lease any available dwelling unit . . . to a
holder of a voucher . . . , a proximate cause of which is the status of
such prospective tenant as a holder of such voucher”); Knapp v. Eagle
Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1995). This requirement
was designed to “prevent landlords from picking and choosing from the
pool of Section 8 applicants who apply to rent apartments.” Salute v.
Stratford Greens Gardens Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1998).
Cases accusing landlords of violating this provision included Graoch
Assoc. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007); Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1272; Glover
v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp.
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

82.

See Graoch Assoc. # 33, 508 F.3d at 391; Salute, 136 F.3d at 297.

83.

See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660
(5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020); Salute, 136 F.3d at
298 (noting “the voluntary nature of the Section 8 program”); Knapp, 54
F.3d at 1280 (same).
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Thus, although federal law bars discrimination against voucher
holders in some types of government-assisted housing, 84 it does not
outlaw this type of discrimination by private landlords.85 And from the
beginning of the Section 8 program, many housing providers have
refused to accept voucher holders.86

84.

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv) (2012) (barring discrimination
against voucher holders in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(“LIHTC”) program); see also Poverty & Race Res. Action Council,
Expanding Choice: Practical Strategies for Building a Successful Housing
Mobility Program, app. B at 140, 145 (2020), available at https://prrac.org/
state-and-local-source-of-income-nondiscrimination-laws_protections/
[https://perma.cc/U9LK-YAL9] (identifying HUD programs that bar
such discrimination, such as HOME and the National Housing Trust
Fund).
Since its inception in 1986, the LIHTC program has supported the
creation of over 3.1 million affordable-housing units. See Off. of Pol’y Dev.
& Res., Dataset: Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. Dep’t of
Housing & Urban Dev.: HUD User, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/6R8T-D58L] (last updated May 24,
2019).

85.

See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 920 F.3d at 900; Salute, 136 F.3d at 298;
Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280.

86.

See, e.g., Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (noting that “non-participating owners
routinely reject section 8 voucher holders”); Mary Cunningham et al.,
U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., A Pilot Study of Landlord
Acceptance of Housing Choice Vouchers 9 (2018), available at
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pilot-study-landlord-acceptance-hcv.html
[https://perma.cc/5BZU-ZZVA] (reviewing “16 studies that examined the
extent of landlord discrimination in jurisdictions nationwide between 2000
and 2017,” and concluding that “research consistently finds evidence of
both perceived and actual landlord discrimination against voucher
holders”); Hiren Nisar et al., U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev.,
Landlord Participation Study: Multidisciplinary Research
Team 13 (2018), available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/
Landlord-Participation-Study-Final-Report.html [https://perma.cc/7PPDMXHS] (reporting that between 2010 and 2016, when voucher use
increased, the number of landlords accepting vouchers “decreased from
just over 700,000 to around 640,000”); Austin Tenants’ Council, An
Audit Report on the Refusal of Housing Choice Vouchers by
Landlords in the Austin MSA 3 (2012), available at https://www
.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=211114 [https://perma.cc/PX9MNM6P] (reporting that 91% of private landlords in Austin, Texas, refuse
to accept vouchers); Lawyers’ Comm. for Better Housing, Inc.,
Locked Out: Barriers to Choice for Housing Voucher Holders 11
(2002), available at https://lcbh.org/reports/locked-out-barriers-choicehousing-voucher-holders [https://perma.cc/PRW5-TA58] (reporting that
over a decade after a Chicago law was enacted banning source-of-income
discrimination, 70% of landlords tested there still discriminated on that
ground).
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Since its inception, the Section 8 voucher program’s goals have been
to aid “low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live” and to
promote “economically mixed housing.” 87 The program was popular
and grew rapidly because it provided assistance quickly, allowed
families a better housing choices, was designed to disperse low-income
families throughout the community, did not create local objections to
public projects, and was relatively inexpensive per family assisted.88
Despite its advantages, the voucher program has never achieved its
full potential and continues to have many problems. Funding depends
on yearly congressional appropriations, which ebb and flow with the
political tide. Eligible families generally spend months on waiting lists
and then have only a limited time to secure appropriate housing, leaving
some vouchers unused.89 This also encourages assisted families to seek
units in their current low-income neighborhoods, a tendency that has
been reinforced by HUD’s method for determining appropriate rent
levels. 90 The program relies on hundreds of different PHAs, whose
priorities, capacities, and abilities vary greatly. From a landlord’s
perspective, having to deal with a local PHA and HUD—including the
need for inspections and uniform lease provisions 91 —may appear
daunting, and the economic incentives to participate in the program
often depend on local-market conditions (e.g., landlords in highopportunity neighborhoods with tight rental markets may see no reason
to deal with the voucher program). And to the extent that landlords
choose not to participate, a voucher user’s housing search becomes that
much more difficult. The result is an uncertain system in which most

87.

42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012); see also id. § 5301(c)(6) (declaring that the
Section 8 program’s objectives include “the reduction of the isolation of
income groups within communities and geographical areas and the
promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods
through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons
of lower income”).

88.

See Seicshnaydre et al., supra note 64, at 187 & nn.108–09.

89.

See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.

90.

See supra note 66.

91.

See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
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vouchers are mainly used in low-income, low-opportunity areas, 92 a
practice that reinforces ethnic- and income-based segregation.93
C. State and Local Source-of-Income Laws
1. Locations and Variety

By 2020, seventeen states and over seventy localities had enacted
housing laws that ban some form of source-of-income discrimination94:
The states are: California; Connecticut; Delaware; Maine; Maryland;
Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Jersey; New York; North Dakota;
Oklahoma; Oregon; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington; and
Wisconsin. 95 The localities include: New York City; Los Angeles;
Chicago; Philadelphia; Washington, D.C.; St. Louis; Memphis;
Milwaukee; Denver; Seattle; San Francisco; and San Diego.96 A handful
of these laws date back to the 1970s, and another twenty were passed
in the 1980s and 1990s. Most—over fifty—have been enacted since
2000,97 with New York state and Los Angeles (both city and county)
being among the most recent.98
These laws reflect a variety of approaches. Some states prohibit
only discrimination against Section 8-voucher recipients and other

92.

See, e.g., Alicia Mazzara & Brian Knudsen, Ctr. On Budget &
Pol’y Priorities, Where Families With Children Use Housing
Vouchers: A Comparative Look at the 50 Largest Metropolitan
Areas 13 (2019), available at https://prrac.org/where-families-withchildren-use-housing-vouchers/ [https://perma.cc/TB87-F82Q]; Barbara
Sard & Douglas Rice, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Realizing
the Housing Voucher Program’s Potential to Enable Families
to Move to Better Neighborhoods 1, 6 (2016), available at https://
www.cbpp.org/research/housing/realizing-the-housing-voucher-programspotential-to-enable-families-to-move-to [https://perma.cc/Q3UE-QVNG];
see also supra note 66.

93.

See, e.g., Seicshnaydre et al., supra note 64, at 173 (noting that HUD “never
structured the [voucher] program to address segregation, deconcentrate lowincome persons, expand housing choice, or further fair housing”); see also
id. at 194–97 (proposing tools for reforming historical flaws in the HCV
program).

94.

See Poverty & Race Res. Action Council, supra note 84.

95.

See infra app. I (providing these laws’ statutory citations, their years of
enactment, and some of their key language).

96.

See infra app. II (providing a more detailed list of such localities).

97.

See Alison Bell et al., Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities,
Prohibiting Discrimination Against Renters Using Housing
Vouchers Improves Results 2–3 (2018), available at https://www
.cbpp.org/research/housing/prohibiting-discrimination-against-renters-usinghousing-vouchers-improves-results [https://perma.cc/SBA8-U3WJ].

98.

See infra apps. I, II (describing these laws in more detail).
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government housing subsidies.99 Others outlaw discrimination based on
a person’s having received governmental “assistance,” which may or
may not include housing vouchers. 100 Others outlaw discrimination
based on “source of income,” but exclude voucher holders from their
protection, either explicitly in the statute or by court interpretation.101
Other “source of income” laws have been interpreted to include voucher

99.

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4.10 (2019) (making it unlawful
“for any person furnishing . . . rental accommodations to discriminate
against any individual . . . who is a tenant receiving federal, state, or
local housing subsidies . . . because the individual is such a recipient”);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4581-A(4) (2019) (making it unlawful
“[f]or any person furnishing rental premises . . . to refuse to rent . . . to
any individual who is a recipient of federal, state or local public assistance,
including . . . housing subsidies, primarily because of the individual’s
status as recipient”); infra app. I; infra notes 109–11.

100. See Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 363A.03, .09 (2019) (barring housing
discrimination because a tenant is “receiving federal, state, or local
subsidies, including rental assistance or rent supplements”); see also N.D.
Cent. Code Ann. §§ 14-02.4-02(19), .5-02(1)–(2) (2019) (barring
discrimination “because of . . . status with respect to . . . public
assistance,” which includes tenants “receiving federal, state, or local
subsidies, including rental assistance or rent supplements”); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 9, § 4503(a)(2) (2019) (barring housing discrimination “because
a person is a recipient of public assistance”); infra app. I.
The Minnesota statute was interpreted to allow landlords to refuse Section
8 voucher holders n Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Limited Partnership, 783
N.W.2d 171, 175–79 (Minn. App. 2010). For a critique of Edwards, see
Derek Waller, Leveraging State and Local Antidiscrimination Laws to
Prohibit Discrimination Against Recipients of Federal Rental Assistance,
27 J. Affordable Housing 401, 415–21 (2018).
101. See Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282–83 (7th Cir.
1995) (interpreting Wisconsin law, which bans housing discrimination
based on “lawful source of income” (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(6) (1995)),
not to include Section 8 vouchers); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4607(j)
(2019) (allowing, within Delaware’s “source of income” law, landlords to
not participate in government rental-assistance programs).
Oregon’s source-of-income law, as originally enacted in 1995, explicitly
did not include “federal rent subsidy payments under [Section 8] and any
other local, state or federal housing assistance.” See Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 659A.421(d)(A) (2010). It was amended in 2013, however, to include
such assistance. See 2013 Or. Laws Ch. 740 (H.B. 2639).
California amended its fair housing law in 1999 to prohibit discrimination
based on a tenant’s “source of income,” but this was interpreted in 2010
not to cover Section 8 vouchers. See Sabi v. Sterling, 183 Cal. App. 4th
916, 929–30 (2010). In 2019, however, this law was amended to include
such coverage. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955(p)(1) (amended by Cal.
Stats. 2019, c. 600 (S.B. 329)).
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holders,102 with some laws explicitly providing for voucher coverage.103
Overall, as a result of these state and local voucher-antidiscrimination
laws, about half of the households using vouchers are now protected.104
The breadth of these laws varies in other ways as well. Some apply
only to rental situations,105 but most cover a wider range of housing
transactions by, for example, simply including in their fair housing laws
“source of income” among the forbidden bases of discrimination.106 In
addition, some state laws have foreclosed certain potential defenses
(e.g., a landlord’s objecting not just to voucher holders as tenants, but

102. See Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739
A.2d 238, 241 (Conn. 1999); Franklin Tower One v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104,
1112–13 (N.J. 1999); see also Montgomery Cty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs.,
936 A.2d 325, 333–34 (Md. 2007) (interpreting Montgomery County’s
source-of-income ordinance to require landlords to accept Section 8
vouchers); Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 826–28 (Ill. App.
2004) (same, regarding Chicago’s source-of-income ordinance).
103. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.421(d)(A) (2013); Feemster v. BSA Ltd.
P’ship, 548 F.3d 1063, 1069–71 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the D.C.
Human Rights Act, which bans discrimination in “‘any transaction in real
property’ . . . ‘wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based
on’ . . . an individual’s ‘source of income,’” “expressly defines ‘source of
income’ as encompassing the Section 8 program”) (quoting D.C. Code
§ 2–1402.21(a)(1)–(2) (2007)); Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549
F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding the same); see also City &
Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 22 Cal. App. 5th 121, 124–25 (2018) (noting
that San Francisco’s fair-housing ordinance, as amended in 1998, outlaws
discrimination based on a person’s “source of income” and defines that
term to include government rent subsidies) (citing S.F., Cal., Police
Code art. 33, § 3304(a) (1998)).
104. See Poverty & Race Research Action Council, supra note 84, app.
B at 1 (noting a 2018 study estimating the figure at 34%, see Alison
Bell et al., supra note 97, but concluding in early 2020 that, due to the
recent passage of source-of-income laws in two states (New York and
California) and several municipalities, a better estimate now would be
"almost 50%").
105. See supra note 99 (Massachusetts and Maine); infra app. I (New York,
New Jersey, and Washington).
106. See, e.g., infra notes 115–13 and accompanying text (Connecticut); supra
note 101 and accompanying text (California); infra app. I (Oregon, Utah,
Vermont, and Wisconsin); supra note 103 (Washington, D.C. and San
Francisco); Montgomery Cty., 936 A.2d at 330–31 (Montgomery County,
Maryland).
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also to the requirements of the governmental program involved), either
explicitly or by judicial interpretation;107 others allow such defenses.108
Two New England states provide examples of the different
approaches. In 1971, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a
statute prohibiting landlords from discriminating against persons using
government vouchers. 109 That statute did not apply to all of the
transactions covered by the state’s fair-housing law, but dealt only with
“rental accommodations.” 110 As originally enacted, this provision
prohibited landlords from discriminating against any recipient of public
assistance or housing subsidies “solely because the individual is such a
recipient.”111 In 1987, the state supreme court interpreted “solely” to
allow a landlord to refuse Section 8 voucher holders because he objected
to the program’s mandated lease terms. 112 Thereafter, the law was
amended both to remove the word “solely” and to add a further
prohibition barring landlords from discriminating “because of any
requirement of such public assistance, rental assistance, or housing
subsidy program.”113 As a result, Massachusetts landlords now may not
reject recipients of any housing-assistance program, nor use as a defense
their objection to the requirements of such a program.114
107. See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 427–31 (Mass.
2007) (Massachusetts); Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d at 248–51 (Connecticut);
Franklin Tower One, 725 A.2d at 1114–15 (New Jersey); see also
Feemster, 548 F.3d at 1069–71 (D.C. law); Montgomery Cty., 936 A.2d at
339–42 (county ordinance).
108. See Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 86 A.3d 52, 58–60
(Me. 2014) (interpreting Maine law); see also Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey,
815 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. App. 2004) (holding that, although Chicago’s
source-of-income ban includes Section 8 vouchers, landlords who reject
voucher holders may raise defenses related to the Section 8 program).
109. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(10) (1971); infra app. I.
110. See DiLiddo, 876 N.E.2d at 422 n.2.
111. Id. at 427.
112. Att’y Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1108–10 (Mass. 1987)
(distinguishing between housing discrimination that occurs “solely”
because a prospective tenant uses a voucher and discrimination that
occurs because a landlord refuses, for economic or other reasons, to be
subject to the voucher program’s requirements).
113. See DiLiddo, 876 N.E.2d at 428–29 (describing Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151B, § 4 (1990)).
114. See id. at 429–31. Thus, landlords cannot claim that their objections to a
program’s requirements amount to a “legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason” for an otherwise unlawful refusal to rent. As the DiLiddo opinion
put it, the amended law delineates what is “legitimate” and
“nondiscriminatory” under the statute. Id. at 429. The law also does not
permit a defense based on the fact that a housing-subsidy program’s
requirements may cause the landlord “substantial economic harm.” Id. at
429–30; cf. Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d
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By contrast, Connecticut has reached a similar result through a
broader statute that, in 1990, simply added to the state’s fair housing
law “lawful source of income” as a prohibited basis of discrimination.115
Nine years later, the state supreme court held that the statute’s new
language prohibits landlords from refusing to rent to otherwise qualified
Section 8 tenants.116
2. Legal Challenges To

State and local laws that ban some form of source-of-income
discrimination obviously go beyond the current FHA. But they are in
no danger of federal preemption on this ground because the FHA has a
provision that explicitly allows any state or local law that “grants,
guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted by” the FHA.117
Some of these laws, however, have been challenged as being inconsistent
with—and thus preempted by—Section 8’s scheme, which makes
landlord-participation in that program “voluntary.”118 Generally, these
challenges have failed. 119 There is one exception, however: a 1995
394, 406 (Mass. 2016) (holding that this law does not prevent Section 8
project-based landlords from withdrawing from this program, which is
appurtenant to the rental unit, not the tenant).
By contrast, Maine’s law outlawed discrimination “primarily” on the
forbidden basis, which parallelled the original version of Massachusetts’s
law. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4581-A(4) (2019). Maine’s law,
however, was not amended, leading that state’s supreme court to interpret
it to allow a landlord to reject voucher holders if the reason for doing so
was to avoid the voucher-program’s requirements. See Dussault v. RRE
Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 86 A.3d 52, 58–60 (Me. 2014).
115. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-64c(a)(1)–(2) (1989); Comm’n on
Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 246
(Conn. 1999).
116. See Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238 at 241–42 (holding that the
Connecticut statute bars landlords from requiring a lease that contains
either tenant-income requirements beyond those contemplated by the
Section 8 program or any other deviations from the voucher-program’s
requirements).
117. See supra note 27.
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
119. See Austin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 894–
96 (W.D. Tex. 2015); Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 F. Supp.
2d 78, 87–89 (D.D.C. 2008); Montgomery Cty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs.,
936 A.2d 325, 339–42 (Md. 2007); Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d at 245–46;
Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1107–15 (N.J. 1999);
Stevenson v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., 24 Cal. App. 4th 269, 280–83
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Att’y Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105–06
(Mass. 1987); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(d) (2018) (explaining that the
federal statutes creating the voucher program are not intended “to preempt operation of State and local laws that prohibit discrimination
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decision in which the Seventh Circuit held that Wisconsin’s “source-ofincome” law did not apply to Section 8 vouchers, in part because the
court was hesitant “to allow a state to make a voluntary federal
program mandatory.”120
The scores of different local ordinances that ban some form of
source-of-income discrimination reveal an even greater variety of
coverage than the states’ laws. Many of these ordinances go beyond
their state’s fair-housing laws, which has prompted some landlords to
challenge local laws as being inconsistent with, and thus preempted by,
their state’s law. 121 The results of these challenges have varied
depending on the specific language of the particular state law involved.
For example, California’s fair housing law—which since 1999 has
banned source-of-income discrimination, but did not until 2019 cover
vouchers and other government subsidies 122 —provides that it is
intended “to occupy the field . . . encompassed” by its antidiscrimination provisions. 123 San Francisco’s source-of-income
ordinance, passed in 1998, explicitly includes voucher holders within its
protection,124 leading landlords in that city to claim that this ordinance
was preempted by the state law. The California court of appeals
rejected that claim, reading the state’s preemption clause narrowly and
thus leaving San Francisco’s broader law intact.125
On the other hand, preemption challenges to New York City’s
source-of-income law—which compels landlords to accept governmental
vouchers—have achieved a modicum of success based on a state statute
that prevents local governments from extending their rent-control
regulations. While this law does not block the City’s basic mandate to
against a Section 8 voucher-holder because of status as a Section 8
voucher-holder”).
120. Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
121. See also Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 931 N.W.2d 410,
429 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing trial court’s ruling that Minneapolis
ordinance, which bars rental discrimination against voucher holders and
other public-assistance recipients on the basis that “the requirements of a
public assistance program,” violated landlords’ rights under state
constitution’s due-process and equal-protection provisions); Apartment
Ass’n of Metro. Pittsburgh, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 107 WAL 2019,
2019 WL 4253476 (Pa. Sept. 9, 2019) (vacating and remanding for further
review lower court's determination that Pittsburgh’s source-of-income
ordinance was invalid under Pennsylvania’s “home rule” law insofar as
the ordinance required landlords to accept Section 8 voucher holders).
122. See Sabi v. Sterling, 183 Cal. App. 4th 916, 928–30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
123. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12993(c) (2019).
124. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 22 Cal. App. 5th 121, 124–25
(2018) (citing S.F., Cal. Police Code art. 33, § 3304(a) (2019)).
125. Id.

596

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

landlords to accept vouchers,126 it has been held to narrow the City’s
mandate so as not to compel landlords to accept a local subsidy
program that requires them to extend leases at the same rent.127
Texas and Indiana both passed laws in 2015 barring localities from
outlawing discrimination against voucher holders in response to local
ordinances (enacted by Austin and Indianapolis, respectively).128 Local
landlords were initially unsuccessful in challenging Austin’s 2014
ordinance, producing a decision that Texas’s current law did not
preempt it.129 Thereafter the state passed legislation barring all of its
localities from prohibiting landlords “from refusing to lease or
rent . . . to a person because the person’s lawful source of income to
pay rent includes funding from a federal housing assistance program.”130
Austin responded with a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin state officials
from enforcing this law based on its alleged disparate impact on
minorities.131 The district court upheld this claim based on the FHA
provision that condemns any state law purporting “to require or permit
any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice” under the
FHA,132 but the Fifth Circuit ordered dismissal of the claim for lack of
jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.133

126. See Tapia v. Successful Mgmt. Corp., 915 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2010).
127. See Alston v. Starrett City, Inc., 74 N.Y.S.3d 211, 215 (N.Y. App. Div.
2018).
128. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 250.007(a) (West 2019); Ind. Code
§ 36-1-3-8.5 (2019). The Texas law was also prompted by concerns that
Dallas would adopt a voucher-included source-of-income law, which it did
in 2016. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Abbott, No. 3:17-CV-0440D, 2018 WL 2415034, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2018).
129. See Austin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 892–
93 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (denying preliminary injunction against city’s
source-of-income ordinance that covers voucher holders, because plaintiffassociation failed to show likelihood of success under various theories).
130. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 250.007(c) (West 2019); see also
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 2018 WL 2415034, at *4–12 (dismissing on
standing and jurisdictional grounds a private plaintiff’s challenge to this
law).
131. See City of Austin v. Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d 749 (W.D. Tex. 2018),
rev'd, 943 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 2018 WL 2415034, at *2 n.1 (quoting plaintiff’s allegation that,
although Texas’s renter households are only 19% Black, the “Texas
voucher population is 86% minority with 55% Black, Non-Hispanic
tenants and 30% Hispanic tenants”).
132. See Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 759–60.
133. See Paxton, 943 F.3d at 997-1004.
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II. Past Experience
A. State-and-Local-Law Cases
1. Types of Cases and a Caution

Virtually all of the claims brought under state and local housing
laws banning source-of-income discrimination have been brought
against landlords. This is explained in part by the fact that some of
these laws are limited to rental situations. 134 Most of these laws,
however, also ban discrimination in sales, financing, insurance, and
other housing transactions, just as the FHA does;135 and even in these
places, the vast majority of source-of-income cases have involved rental
housing.
For example, Chicago’s fair-housing ordinance covers a wide variety
of housing transactions and has outlawed source-of-income
discrimination since 1990.136 The agency that enforces this law—the
Chicago Commission on Human Relations (“CCHR”)—has produced a
total of eighteen decisions in fully litigated cases involving source-ofincome discrimination, and all were brought against landlords or their
agents.137 A similar pattern exists in New York City and other places
with an active source-of-income docket. 138 Indeed, source-of-income
claims against defendants other than landlords have produced only a
handful of reported decisions.139
A word of caution: Experience in places with source-of-income laws
shows that such prohibitions are not a panacea for this type of
discrimination. In New York City and Chicago, for example, housing
134. For instance, those in Massachusetts and Maine. See supra notes 99, 105
and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See generally infra apps. I, II
(describing various state and local source-of-income laws).
136. See Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 5-8-030 (2019).
137. See Chi. Comm’n on Human Relations, Board Ruling Digest (2018),
available at https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cchr/
AdjSupportingInfo/AdjFORMS/2018AdjForms/BoardRulingsDigestFEB
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNN4-QE7R] (describing the CCHR’s rulings
in cases from 2002 through February 2018, and reporting that all eighteen
housing cases that alleged source-of-income discrimination involved rental
situations).
138. See N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, Fiscal Year 2018 Annual
Report 22 (2018).
139. See, e.g., Sisemore v. Master Fin., Inc. 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724-25 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also infra notes 181–185 and accompanying text
(discussing source-of-income cases involving insurance companies that
allegedly refused to provide coverage for landlords who rented to Section
8 tenants); infra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing cases against
municipalities and others accused of harassing Section 8 voucher users).
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providers’ substantial non-compliance has continued years after each
city enacted a source-of-income law.140 In 2018, the N.Y.C. Commission
on Human Rights, noting “the pervasive problem of landlords refusing
to rent to tenants with housing vouchers,” established a special
enforcement unit “focused exclusively on combatting source of income
discrimination” and used testers “to verify reports of such pervasive
discrimination.” 141 In Chicago, the CCHR, having recognized that
source-of-income discrimination “continues as a significant fair housing
issue,” retained a local civil rights organization to conduct a testerbased study of this type of discrimination,142 the results of which were
published in 2018 and showed substantial on-going source-of-income
discrimination.143 It also seems noteworthy—and perhaps ironic—that
New York City and Chicago, despite their substantial efforts to reduce
source-of-income discrimination, remain among the most racially
segregated metropolitan areas in the country.144
140. See N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 138, at 38
(reporting that source-of-income complaints accounted for over one-third
(94 of 274) of the total housing complaints received); Chi. Comm’n on
Human Relations, 2017 Annual Report 11 (2018) [hereinafter Chi.
2017 Report] (reporting that almost half of the housing discrimination
complaints received (30 of 64) “alleged source of income discrimination,
most of which involve Housing Choice Vouchers”); Chi. Comm’n on
Human Relations, Annual Report: 2009, at 8 (2010) (reporting that
two-thirds (40 of 60) of the housing discrimination complaints received
claimed source-of-income discrimination); see also Isabelle M. Thabault
& Eliza P. Platts-Mills, Discrimination Against Participants in the
Housing Choice Voucher Program: An Enforcement Strategy, 15
Poverty & Race 11, 12 (2006) (reporting that, although the Washington,
D.C. Human Rights Act had prohibited source-of-income discrimination
since 1977, a 2003–05 testing program showed that 58% of landlords there
either refused to accept vouchers or placed significant limitations on their
use).
141. N.Y. City Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 138, at 22, 33–34
(reporting that the N.Y.C. Commission launched its own investigations,
including testing, in almost 200 housing cases, the vast majority of which
involved source-of-income discrimination).
142. Chi. 2017 Report, supra note 140, at 10.
143. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights, 2018 Fair Housing
Testing Report 2 (2018) (reporting that, even though Chicago’s law
has banned source-of-income discrimination since 1990, tests continue to
show such discrimination); see also Laramore v. Ritchie Realty Mgmt.
Co., 397 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2005) (dealing with Chicago apartment
management company that, in 2002, allegedly had a policy against renting
to Section 8–voucher users); Lawyers’ Comm. for Better Housing,
Inc., supra note 86, at 10–11 (finding in an earlier Chicago study that
“[v]oucher holders are denied access to approximately 70% of the market
rate units that are supposedly available to them”).
144. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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2. Cases Against Landlords

Source-of-income cases against landlords fall into two categories:
(1) those in which the defendant admits its source-of-income
discrimination, but tries to justify the practice; and (2) those in which
the landlord denies the charge altogether. In the former, landlords have
argued that the burdens of dealing with the Section 8 program (e.g.,
additional paperwork, required lease provisions, inspections by
government agencies) justify their non-participation in this program.
Some states and localities allow such a defense, while others do not,
either because their laws explicitly foreclose it or their courts have
interpreted their laws to do so.145
Cases in which a landlord denies the source-of-income-discrim–
ination charge may arise from a variety of practices, including: outright
refusals to rent;146 discrimination in the rental’s terms or conditions;147
“steering” (e.g., narrowing a prospective tenant’s options to certain
properties that already accept vouchers); 148 or discriminatory ads,

145. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
146. State and local fair-housing laws modeled on the FHA ban not only
outright refusals to rent on a prohibited basis, but also discriminatory
negotiations and other practices that make housing unavailable. See 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012); Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:2.
147. State and local laws modeled on the FHA also outlaw harsher terms,
stricter application requirements, and other discriminatory rental
conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012); Schwemm, supra note 11,
§ 14:2 & nn.1–5; see also Memorandum Regarding Source of Income
Protections Under Cook County Human Rights Ordinance from Ranjit
Hakin, Executive Director, Cook County Department of Human Rights
and Ethics (Nov. 20, 2013) (found in Housing Authority of Cook County
Ownership Packet) (advising landlords and property managers that they
should not treat “voucher holders less favorably than other potential
tenants by inflating rents or screening such applicants more stringently”
or by applying rent-to-income-ratio requirements in a manner that
discriminates against voucher holders); Brown v. Tam Khuong An
Nguyen, Chicago Comm’n on Human Rts. (CCHR) No. 15-H-7, at 4 (Jan.
12, 2017) (noting that a prima facie case of illegal discrimination under
Chicago’s source-of-income ordinance may be made by showing that the
complainant “was offered housing on terms different from the offers made
to others”).
148. A landlord’s “steering” has long been understood to make housing
“unavailable” in violation of the FHA and similarly worded state and local
laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012); Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 13:5–
:6, 14:2 n.20 (noting that this practice may also violate other provisions
of these statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012)); see also Hawkins
v. Village Green Holding Co., LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9 (July 12,
2018) (rejecting source-of-income-steering claim due to inadequate proof).
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statements, and other communications in which the defendant
announces its policy of not renting to government-assisted tenants.149
All of these claims present issues of proof that can be decided using
familiar and long-established principles, as demonstrated by the
eighteen decisions issued by Chicago’s CCHR over the past two
decades.150 For instance, a plaintiff may prove a defendant’s unlawful
motivation by direct evidence,151 and claims proven by direct evidence
generally involve a defendant’s ads or statements that would also be
unlawful.152 In the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff may use the
prima-facie-case, burden-shifting approach to prove illegal intent.153 If
a prima facie case cannot be established because the plaintiff did not
apply to rent from the defendant, she may use the “futile gesture”
theory to excuse this failure.154 And testers may be used to show that
a defendant’s proferred justification for not dealing with a protectedclass member is really a pretext for discrimination rather than a
legitimate excuse.155
149. Ads, statements, and notices that indicate a discriminatory preference or
limitation violate state and local laws if those laws include a provision
similar to that in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). See Schwemm, supra note
11, § 15; infra Part IV.C (regarding possible § 3406(c) violations involving
source-of-income discrimination).
150. The CCHR has consistently interpreted Chicago’s fair-housing ordinance
in line with FHA precedent. See, e.g., Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC, CCHR
No. 14-H-61, at 14 n.8 (May 11, 2017). This is also true for most states
and localities with fair-housing laws. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 30:2
n.4.
151. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:2 & nn.6–8; see also Hall v. Woodgett,
CCHR No. 13-H-51, at 4–5 (Oct. 8, 2015); Shipp v. Wagner, CCHR No.
12-H-19, at 7 (July 16, 2014); Rankin v. 6954 N. Sheridan, Inc., CCHR
No. 08-H-49, at 7 (Aug. 18, 2010); Diaz v. Wykurz, CCHR No. 07-H-28,
at 6–7 (Dec. 16, 2009).
152. See Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 10:2 n.7 and accompanying text, 32:3;
see also Shipp, CCHR No. 12-H-19, at 7; Hutchison v. Iftekaruddin,
CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 7 (Feb. 17, 2010).
153. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:2 nn.25–26 and accompanying text;
see also Hawkins, CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 6; Gardner v. Ojo, CCHR No.
10-H-50, at 10 (Dec. 19, 2012); Hutchison, CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 6.
154. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:2 n.35; see also Rankin v. 6954 N.
Sheridan, Inc., CCHR No. 08-H-49, at 7–8 (Aug. 18, 2010); cf. Hawkins,
CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 8–9 (ruling against futile-gesture theory on the
facts here); Gardner, CCHR No. 10-H-50, at 12 (same).
155. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 32:2 (discussing the use of testers to
prove housing discrimination). In places where local fair-housing laws
have banned source-of-income discrimination, some enforcement agencies
and advocacy groups have already used testing to produce evidence of this
form of discrimination. See, e.g., supra notes 137–140 and accompanying
text; Fair Housing Ctr. of West Mich., 50 Years of Fair Housing:
A Constellation of Opportunities, 2018 Annual Report 4 (2019)
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Although less common than claims of intentional discrimination,
disparate-impact claims based on source-of-income discrimination have
also been dealt with in CCHR decisions. These cases usually involved
a voucher-holder’s challenge to a landlord’s minimum-income require–
ment (e.g., that a tenant’s income must be at least three times the
rent), with the CCHR—based on FHA precedents—recognizing that
such a theory may succeed, but requiring proper statistical evidence to
support the claim.156
B. Source-of-Income Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
1. Overview

Although the FHA does not ban source-of-income discrimination,
it has often been invoked to challenge policies that bar tenants who rely
on vouchers, Social Security, or other forms of non-wage income. Most
of these claims allege that the defendant’s policy has a disparate impact
on racial minorities or other FHA-protected groups, but some allege
intent-based discrimination, and still others challenged refusals to
accommodate disabled tenants. These FHA claims have yielded mixed
results.
2. Impact Claims: Race and National Origin

Blacks, Latinos, and other FHA-protected groups are dispropor–
tionately represented among HCV recipients nationwide157—although
(reporting on source-of-income tests in which over 60% showed evidence
of discrimination); Fair Housing Justice Ctr., Source of Income
Discrimination Lawsuit Filed, Opening Acts Newsletter (Oct. 26,
2018), http://www.fairhousingjustice.org [https://perma.cc/22GA-XHZ3]
(reporting that the Center’s “testing investigation . . . corroborated the
alleged source of income discrimination” in the referenced lawsuit); see
also Fred Freiberg & Gregory D. Squires, Changing Contexts and New
Directions for the Use of Testing, 17 Citiscape 87, 91 (2015) (describing
testing for racial discrimination in a municipality’s Section 8 rentalassistance program).
156. See Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 18 (May 11, 2017)
(ruling against impact claim due to inadequate proof); see also Chicago
Comm’n on Human Rts., Subject Matter Index 167 (2015)
(describing the use of the disparate-impact theory in the 1992 CCHR
decisions McClinton v. Antioch Haven Homes/Haynes and Campbell v.
Brown/Dearborn Parkway Realty), available at https://www.chicago.gov/
content/dam/city/depts/cchr/AdjSupportingInfo/AdjFORMS/2015%20
Adjudication%20Forms/SubjectMatterIndexMay2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZKU5-KFSS]. See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:6 (describing
disparate-impact claims under the FHA).
157. See, e.g., 2017 HUD Report, supra note 58, at 66 (reporting that in the
eighteen-month period ending September 30, 2017, voucher-receiving
heads-of-households were 48.5% black, 17.3% Latino, 79.3% female, and
43.6% disabled).
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the demographics vary from place to place158—and landlords with antivoucher policies have been sued in a number of FHA-impact cases. The
earliest reported decision was in 1989 in Bronson v. Crestwood Lake
Section 1 Holding Corp. 159 There, the court awarded preliminary
injunctive relief to two black voucher holders who had been rejected by
an apartment complex in Yonkers, New York, based on the court’s view
that the defendants’ anti-voucher and other screening policies “do
indeed have a substantial disparate impact on minority persons.”160
A more recent example is Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v.
Kosova Properties, Inc.,161 where a large New York City landlord was
sued in 2016 for racial discrimination under the FHA and for source-ofincome discrimination under the local fair-housing law.162 One of the
advantages of having such a local law is that a claim under it can be
brought along with a FHA claim in federal court based on supplemental
jurisdiction. 163 Conversely, because FHA claims may be asserted in
158. See Deborah J. Devine et al., U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban
Dev., Housing Choice Voucher Location Patterns: Implications
for Participant and Neighborhood Welfare, app. B at 101 (2003)
(providing the race/ethnicity and age of the HCV populations of the nation’s
fifty largest metropolitan areas), available at https://www.huduser.gov/
publications/pdf/location_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3QA-SXSP];
see also Mazzara & Knudsen, supra note 92, at 1 (finding that “figures
vary widely among the 50 largest metro areas” regarding the opportunity
levels of neighborhoods where vouchers are used by families with children).
159. 724 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
160. Id. at 149, 154 (“Application of Crestwood’s policy of rejecting holders of
Section 8 vouchers, alone, would have the effect of disqualifying from
tenancies 6.06% of the minority households in the applicant pool, but only
0.25% of non-minority households in the pool. Stated another way, the
odds of being excluded from Crestwood on the basis of the Section 8 policy
is over twenty-five times greater for minority persons than for nonminorities. These figures are hardly surprising given the fact that, while
only 16.7% of the total applicant pool represents minority households,
82.6% of the Section 8 voucher holders within that pool are minorities.”)
(citations omitted). The defendants’ other challenged requirement—that
a tenant’s income be at least three times the rent—was also found to have
“a substantially disparate impact upon otherwise qualified minority
households.” Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants applied
their screening policies in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 157.
161. Complaint at 1, No. 1:16-cv-03537 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016).
162. Id. at 19, 22. The complaint also alleged intentional racial discrimination
in violation of the FHA and intentional and impact-based racial
discrimination in violation of the local human-rights law. Id. at 17–21.
The New York City Human Rights Law, unlike the FHA, explicitly bans
source-of-income discrimination. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8107(5)(a)(1) (2019).
163. See, e.g., Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 555,
560 (D. Conn. 2015) (“Plaintiffs . . . assert claims . . . under both federal
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state courts,164 a case involving both a race-based FHA claim and a
source-of-income claim under a state or local law can be brought in
state court.165 In Kosova Properties, the defendants, after a year and a
half of pre-trial activities, agreed to a judgment that included injunctive
relief and $620,000 in monetary relief.166
Another recent successful use of the FHA was Crossroads Residents
Organized for Stable and Secure Residencies v. MSP Crossroads
Apartments LLC,167 where the court upheld an impact-based challenge
to a Minneapolis landlord’s plan to stop accepting voucher users—
allegedly disproportionately people of color—as part of its effort to
upgrade its large apartment complex.168 The case was settled in 2018
for some $600,000.169
But many FHA-based challenges to landlords’ anti-voucher policies
have failed. Indeed, in Knapp v. Eagle Property Management Corp.,170
the Seventh Circuit opined that, because “participation in the section
8 program is voluntary,” landlords could not be held liable under the

and state law.”); L.C. v. Lefrak Org., 987 F. Supp. 2d 391, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (describing claims brought under local law along with federal
claims). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018) (providing federal courts
with supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are factually
related to a federal-question claim in the same case).
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2018); see also Schwemm, supra note 11,
§ 25:1 n.2 (providing examples of state-court cases in which FHA claims
were asserted).
165. See Daniel J. Sernovitz, D.C. Construction and Property Management
Firm Settles Housing Discrimination Suit, Wash. Bus. J. (Dec. 11, 2017,
12:02 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2017/12/11/
management-firm-settles-discrimination-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/
3GNJ-EFX3] (describing six-figure settlement of a case brought in local
court that alleging race and source-of-income discrimination under both
the FHA and local fair-housing law based on defendant’s refusal to rent
to voucher holders); Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48
N.E.3d 394, 398 (Mass. 2016) (describing claims brought under both the
FHA and Massachusetts law).
166. See Settlement Agreement and Order at 3–4, Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., Inc. v.
Kosova Prop., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-03537-LGS (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017).
167. No. CV 16-233 ADM/KMM, 2016 WL 3661146 (D. Minn. July 5, 2016).
168. The Crossroads Residents plaintiffs also alleged disability-impact and
intentional discrimination under the FHA. Id. at 6–8.
169. See Soderstrom v. MSP Crossroads Apartments LLC, No. 16-233
ADM/KMM, 2018 WL 692912, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2018) (authorizing
settlement that included $300,000 for the individual tenants, $200,000 for
the housing-organization plaintiffs, and $110,000 in attorneys’ fees and
costs).
170. 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995).
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FHA “for racial discrimination under the disparate impact theory.”171
Since then, two other circuits—the Second and Fifth, both in split
decisions—have agreed with this position.172
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach in 2007, holding that a
FHA-impact claim might lie for a landlord’s withdrawal from the
voucher program, 173 but that the claim there failed because of
inadequate proof of disparate racial impact.174 In a similar vein, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in 2017 that, although a
FHA-impact claim could be brought to challenge a Section 8 projectbased landlord’s decision to withdraw from the program,175 the specific

171. Id. at 1280.
172. The Second Circuit’s decision in Salute v. Stratford Greens Gardens
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998), came three years after Knapp.
In Salute, the plaintiffs asserted a disability-based impact claim that
challenged the defendant-landlord’s refusal to accept vouchers. The
Second Circuit rejected this claim:
We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s observation that because
the Section 8 program is voluntary and non-participating owners
routinely reject Section 8 tenants, the owners’ “non-participation
constitutes a legitimate reason for their refusal to accept section
8 tenants and . . . we therefore cannot hold them liable
for . . . discrimination under the disparate impact theory.”
Id. at 302 (alteration in original) (quoting Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
The Fifth Circuit’s decision came in a race-based challenge to a “No
Section 8” policy. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920
F.3d 890 (5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020). There, the majority noted
“the voluntary nature of landlord participation in the voucher program,”
id. at 901, and concluded that to uphold plaintiff’s impact claim “would
effectively mandate a landlord’s participation in the voucher program any
time the racial makeup of multi-family rental complex does not match the
demographics of a nearby metropolitan area,” id. at 909.
173. Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro. Hum.
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 2007). The majority agreed
with Knapp “that a landlord should never face disparate-impact liability
for non-participation in Section 8,” but held that “withdrawal” by the
landlord was different from “non-participation” and could be subject to a
FHA-impact challenge. Id.
174. Id. at 377–78. In dissent, Judge Moore argued that the landlord had
conceded the disparate-impact point and thus the case should be
remanded to consider the landlord’s “business necessity” justification for
withdrawing from the voucher program. Id. at 393 (Moore, J., dissenting).
175. Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394, 409, 411
(Mass. 2016).

605

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

allegations in that case did not satisfy the requirements of such a
claim.176
Other recent decisions have ruled against similar FHA-impact
claims based on inadequate allegations or proof.177 Noteworthy here is
the Fifth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.
v. Lincoln Property Co., which, by a 2-1 vote, affirmed the dismissal of
an impact-based challenge to a Dallas-area landlord’s refusal to accept
voucher users.178 The majority held that the plaintiff’s allegations were
inadequate to establish a causal connection between any racial impact
and the defendant’s anti-voucher policy, 179 a conclusion the dissent
vigorously disputed.180
In a variation on these cases against landlords, FHA-impact claims
have succeeded in a series of cases against insurance companies that
denied coverage to landlords who do rent to voucher holders. The first
decision was in 2015 in Jones v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of
America, where a California landlord alleged that the defendant’s antivoucher policy had a disparate impact on racial minorities and other

176. Id. at 412 (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to adequately allege
a sufficient causal connection between the defendant’s withdrawal from
the voucher program and the alleged negative impact on minorities).
177. See Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 F. App’x. 279, 281–82 (4th
Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment for defendant-landlord who
withdrew from a voucher program while facing claims of intentional and
impact-based discrimination against racial minorities and disabled
persons); Lincoln Property, 920 F.3d at 906 (describing the district court’s
denial of the plaintiff’s claim due to a lack of causation evidence).
178. 920 F.3d at 895. In addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, without dissent,
the dismissal of the plaintiff’s FHA racial-intent claim, as well as its claim
regarding discriminatory statements under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). Id.
at 909–12; see also infra Part IV.C (regarding claims under § 3604(c)).
179. 920 F.3d at 906, 909. The district court ruled not only that the plaintiff
failed to allege the necessary causal connection, but also that its
allegations were inadequate to show a disparate racial impact because
they were based on statistics for census tracts rather than neighborhoods
or communities. See id. at 906. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion did not rely
on this distinction, although it expressed skepticism about using censustract data for such an impact claim. Id. at 907 n.9. The majority also did
not find it necessary to review an alternative ground for the district
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s impact claim: that the defendants’
justification for their anti-voucher policies—avoiding the burdens of the
Section 8 program—was adequate to rebut an impact claim and that the
plaintiff had failed to allege a less discriminatory alternative. See id. at
906.
180. Id. at 913 (Davis, J., dissenting); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project v.
Lincoln Prop. Co., 930 F.3d 660, 661 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020) (Haynes, J., dissenting) (disputing the
panel majority’s reasoning in rejecting the plaintiff’s impact claim).
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FHA-protected groups.181 The court denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on all claims,182 noting, with respect to the impact
claims, that the plaintiffs’ evidence showed that the defendant’s “No
Section 8 rule [had] a statistically significant disparate impact on the
basis of race, sex, age, and familial status,” and thus “Travelers’
conduct predictably falls more heavily on protected classes and results
in discrimination.” 183 Similar decisions were later issued in Viens v.
America Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. 184 and National Fair
Housing Alliance v. Travelers Indemnity Co.185
3. Impact Claims: Disability and Other Protected Classes

As discussed above, some of the successful FHA-impact challenges
to anti-voucher policies have alleged not only race and national-origin
discrimination, but also discrimination against other FHA-protected
groups.186 Disability, in particular, has been involved in a number of
these cases.
One noteworthy example is L.C. v. Lefrak Organization, Inc.,187
where a prospective tenant tried to use a New York City housing
subsidy for persons with HIV/AIDS and was refused by the defendant181. Complaint at 1–2, 6–7, No. 5:13-CV-02390 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2013)
(alleging FHA-impact claims based on race, sex, familial status, and
disability, as well as FHA-based intent and interference claims).
182. Transcript of Proceedings at *5, Jones, No. 5:13-CV-02390, 2015 WL
5091908 (May 7, 2015).
183. Id.
184. 113 F. Supp. 3d 555 (D. Conn. 2015). The plaintiffs alleged FHA-impact
claims based on race and national origin, and source-of-income claims
under Connecticut’s fair-housing law, all of which survived the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 558–60. After the court denied that
motion, the parties settled the case for $475,000 and injunctive relief. See
Consent Decree at 2, Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 3:14cv-00952-JBA (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2015).
185. 261 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.D.C. 2017). The complaint alleged FHA violations
of race, sex, and familial-status discrimination based on the claim that
families using vouchers in the D.C. area are “disproportionately headed
by African-American women.” Id. at 23. The court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss, id. at 35, and the parties subsequently settled for
$450,000 and injunctive relief. See National Fair Housing Alliance Settles
Disparate Impact Lawsuit with Travelers Indemnity Company, Nat’l Fair
Housing Alliance (Feb. 23, 2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/2018/
02/23/travelers/ [https://perma.cc/FB5L-YYMN]; see also Sisemore v.
Master Fin., Inc. 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(upholding source-of-income claim against a finance company that refused
Sisemore a mortgage for a home she intended to use as a day care).
186. See supra notes 168, 181, and 185 (describing cases involving allegations
of disability, sex, familial-status, and color discrimination).
187. 987 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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landlord. As in Kosova Properties, the plaintiff in LeFrak alleged
impact-based and intentional discrimination in violation of the FHA
and a source-of-income claim under the city’s fair housing law, all of
which prevailed in a 2013 decision.188 A year after this ruling, the case
was settled for $262,500.189
Another type of FHA-disability impact claim is illustrated by Fair
Housing Rights Center in Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Morgan
Properties Management Co., LLC. 190 There, a large apartment
company’s requirement that rent be paid on the first day of the month
could not be met by tenants who relied on Social Security Disability
Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits because those benefits did not arrive until
later in the month.191 The plaintiff alleged both impact and reasonableaccommodation claims under the FHA, both of which survived the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.192 As for the impact claim,
the court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
disparate impact against disabled persons 193 and that fact issues
188. Complaint at 18–22, Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., Inc. v. Kosova Properties,
Inc., No. 1:16-cv-03537 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016); LeFrak Org., 987 F.
Supp. 2d at 401–02, 404; see also Cales v. New Castle Hill Realty, 1:10cv-03426-DAB-KNF, 2011 WL 335599, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011)
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that landlord
refused prospective tenant because she used the city’s disabled-person
housing subsidy). In upholding the FHA-impact claims in LeFrak, the
court noted that the complaint states:
[A]s of 2010, New York City had a population of approximately
eight million individuals, the HIV population in New York City
was approximately 67,000 people, 49% of which are HASA
[HIV/AIDS Services Administration] clients, the “vast majority”
of which utilize a HASA housing subsidy. This adequately puts
defendants on notice that plaintiffs’ alleged basis for disparate
impact is that the percentage of the HIV population in New York
City on housing subsidies exceeds the percentage of the non-HIV
New York City population on housing subsidies.
987 F. Supp. 2d at 402–03.
189. See Settlement Agreement at 9, Chacon v. LeFrak Org., No. 1:13-CV02759 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2014).
190. No. 16-4677, 2018 WL 3208159 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2018).
191. Id. at *1.
192. Id. at *5–11.
193. The plaintiff’s expert noted that “many if not most SSDI recipients live
benefit check to benefit check while being tied to the government’s
disbursal schedule, and so are unable to rent apartments from Defendants
which they would otherwise be able to afford.” Id. at *10. The court
continued:
FHRC argues that nearly all SSDI recipients, or close to onehundred percent, are negatively impacted by this policy. It seems
clear that this policy does not impact non-disabled but otherwise

608

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

remained as to whether a less discriminatory alternative could serve the
defendants’ legitimate business interests.194 Similarly, in 1996, in Ryan
v. Ramsey,195 the court upheld FHA impact and intent claims against
a Texas landlord who rejected the plaintiff because his income came
from SSDI and he did not have a job.196 In the same vein is Connecticut
Fair Housing Center, Inc. v. Rosow,197 which involved a FHA-disability
claim based on the impact theory that challenged a Hartford landlord’s
“Must Be Employed” requirement.198 And in recent years, HUD and
similarly situated tenants at any rate even close to one-hundred
percent. Therefore, FHRC has established a prima facie case of
disparate impact.
Id. at *10–11.
194. Id. at *11. The court rejected the defendants’ proffered legitimate reasons
for the policy:
[The defendants] argue that they have imposed their challenged
rental policy because their business model is set up to receive rent
in the beginning of the month, all of their systems are coordinated
to collect rent on the first of the month, and making their
properties’ mortgage payments and utility bills requires a certain
amount of cash reserves which would be upset by variable rental
due dates. These are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
their stated policy.
Defendants have failed to show[, however,] that any alternatives
to their inflexible policy would impose an undue hardship under
the circumstances of this specific case. [Plaintiff]’s proposed
alternative is to institute a flexible, fact-specific, individualized
assessment for each SSDI recipient who requests a changed due
date based on their benefits schedule. Defendants argue that this
proposed alternative would fundamentally alter their business and
create undue financial and administrative hardship. Defendants
offer little substantive evidence to support their argument. They
offer no real calculation of the cost of changing this policy,
and . . . their “fundamentally altered business practices”
arguments are contradicted by the evidence submitted by
[plaintiff] that Defendants already make similar accommodations
for many of their tenants.
Id. at *10–11.
195. 936 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
196. Id. at 423–27. In upholding the impact claim, the court noted that “an
individual’s status as a Social Security disability benefit recipient is
inextricably linked to his status as a disabled person.” Id. at 427.
197. See Complaint at 1, No. 3:10-cv-01987-MRK (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 2010).
198. Id. at 8. This case settled in 2013 for $150,000. See Jenna Carlesso,
Property Manager Settles Fair Housing Lawsuit, Hartford Courant
(May 15, 2013), https://www.courant.com/community/hartford/hc-xpm2013-05-15-hc-hartford-settlement-0516-20130515-story.html [https://perma
.cc/TQ4G-HZB5].
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other federal agencies with regulatory authority over mortgage
providers have issued guidance designed to curb similar types of
discrimination against SSDI recipients.199
The FHA has also been invoked in non-disability cases. 200 A
prominent example is Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp.,201 where
the Ninth Circuit upheld FHA impact and intent claims based on
familial status that challenged a landlord’s refusal to accept tenants
receiving Aid-to-Families-with-Dependent-Children (“AFDC”) bene–
fits, which only go to families with children.202
199. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Bulletin 2014-03,
Social Security Disability Income Verification 4 (2014) (describing
HUD and other agencies’ guidance to lenders that they should consider
SSDI benefits “likely to continue,” and thus they “should not request
additional documentation from the borrower to demonstrate continuance”
of such income); see also id. at 2–3 (describing similar CFPB advice
regarding lenders’ obligations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and its implementing regulations).
200. See cases cited supra notes 181, 185, and infra note 202.
201. 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997).
202. Id. at 248–51; see also Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., Ltd., No. C96-1542C,
1997 WL 1526484, at *1, *7 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997) (ruling in favor
of a Section 8 tenant class’s FHA-impact claims against their landlord
who sought to evict them as part of a decision to stop participating in the
program). Statistics played an important role in the court’s ruling:
The figures show that extremely high percentages (81.1 to
100[%]) of members of the protected classes at issue belong to the
group of current Section 8 tenants who would be excluded from
[defendant’s complex] Avalon Ridge . . . . The figures show a
similarly high percentage (49.3 to 84.8[%]) of these protected class
members among prospective Section 8 tenants who are registered
with the [local housing agency]. Moreover, the figures demonstrate
that the percentage of protected class members among both
current and prospective tenants are substantially higher than the
percentages of those groups in the general populations of Renton
and the Seattle metropolitan area.
Plaintiff also presents figures . . . regarding the rates at
which members of the protected classes and members outside the
protected classes are impacted. Plaintiff’s numbers indicate that
the no-Section 8 policy would have terminated the leases of
13.5[%] of the African–American tenancies at Avalon Ridge, but
would have terminated the leases of only 6.7[%] of the Caucasian
households. More tellingly, the policy would have evicted 17.5[%]
of the households with children, but would have evicted 0[%] of
the households without children. Finally, plaintiffs maintain that
the policy would have evicted 31.9% of the households headed by
women, but would have evicted 0[%] of the households headed by
men.
Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted). The court also held that the defendant’s
proferred justification for its new anti-voucher policy was inadequate and
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4. Disability: Reasonable Accommodation Claims

In some of the disability-impact cases discussed in the previous
section, the plaintiffs also asserted a claim based on the FHA’s
reasonable-accommodation (“RA”) mandate, which requires housing
providers to modify their rules and policies in order to provide equal
housing opportunities for persons with disabilities. 203 The judicial
response to these RA claims has been mixed, in part because, in
contrast to impact claims that focus on a challenged policy’s broad
statistical effect, RA claims generally depend on the particular facts of
a disabled person’s situation.204
One example of a plaintiff’s successful RA claim is Edwards v. Gene
Salter Properties. 205 There, the Eighth Circuit reversed summary
judgment against would-be tenants who received SSDI benefits and
thus could not show pay stubs, tax returns, or other indicia of financial
worthiness required by the defendant-landlord.206 The appellate court
concluded that “the requested accommodation was necessary and
reasonable” and that the defendant’s suggested alternatives of “allowing
a co-signer or prepaying the full lease term were not substitutes for
accommodating plaintiffs, who had sufficient income to rent the
apartment, because those options did not level the playing field but
instead posed an additional burden on the disabled applicant.”207
By way of contrast, a FHA-RA claim failed in Batista v.
Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio,208 where a disabled
tenant whose Section 8 benefits no longer qualified her to stay in a
three-bedroom apartment sought to remain there without paying the
full rent. The First Circuit upheld the landlord’s denial of this request:
[T]he Cooperativa[’s denial] rested solely on Batista’s inability to
pay, which she appears to concede arises only from her need for
that genuine issues remained as to plaintiff’s intentional-discrimination
claims. Id. at *7.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2018).
204. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:8 n.12 and accompanying text.
205. 739 F. App’x 357 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1271 (2019).
206. Id. at 358 (“Plaintiffs could not provide the required documentation
because their only sources of income were social security disability income
(SSDI), retirement benefits, and rental income. Plaintiffs offered to
provide proof of these income sources, but defendants refused to accept
such proof.”).
207. Id. On remand, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s
reasonable-accommodation claim and awarded her $1,380 in damages.
Edwards v. Gene Salter Props., No. 4:15CV00571, 2019 WL 2651109, at
*1 (E.D. Ark. June 27, 2019).
208. 776 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2015).

611

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act
federal rental support . . . . [S]he does not contend the
denial . . . resulted from any policy of the Cooperativa that
would prevent her from acquiring the funds necessary to make
the rent, which she does not contend must be lowered.209

The mixed results in FHA-RA cases also reflect a judicial split in
principle between the Second and Ninth Circuits. In Salute v. Stratford
Greens Garden Apartments,210 a divided panel of the Second Circuit
ruled against FHA and other claims by two disabled plaintiffs who
received Section 8 assistance and were rejected by a large apartment
complex in suburban New York that did not accept applicants with
vouchers.211 The majority held that the defendants did not violate the
FHA-RA mandate by not accepting plaintiffs’ Section 8 vouchers,212
because a landlord’s participation in the voucher program was
sufficiently burdensome to render the plaintiffs’ request unreasonable213

209. Id. at 43 (citing Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d
293, 302 (2d Cir.1998) (“impecunious people with disabilities stand on the
same footing as everyone else”)). The court found no evidence of
intentional disability discrimination, but it upheld the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim. Id. at 43–45.
210. 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
211. Id. at 297–302. In addition to their FHA-RA claim, the plaintiffs asserted
a FHA-disability impact claim and a claim under Section 8’s “Take One,
Take All” requirement, all of which the majority rejected. Id. Judge
Calabresi vigorously disagreed with all three rulings. See id. at 302–13
(Calabresi, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 299–302 (majority opinion).
213. The court reasoned:
We think . . . the burdens of Section 8 participation are
substantial enough that participation should not be forced on
landlords, either as an accommodation to handicap or otherwise
. . . . A landlord may consider that participation in a federal
program will or may entail financial audits, maintenance
requirements, inspection of the premises, reporting requirements,
increased risk of litigation, and so on . . . . Moreover, the Section
8 program could end, leaving the landlord with the dilemma of
evicting the participating tenants or keeping tenants who lack the
wherewithal to pay the full rent—both major commercial risks.
The landlord here explained the refusal to accept Section 8 tenants
in terms of a general reluctance to become involved with the
federal government and its rules and regulations . . . .
In short, it is easy to conclude that, for landlords who reject
voluntary Section 8 participation, the contract with the federal
government, the retention of counsel to make the Section 8
arrangements, the requirements for compliance, and the
limitations on use (actual and potential), are “unreasonable
costs,” an “undue hardship,” and a “substantial burden,” which

612

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

and, more fundamentally, that the plaintiffs were inappropriately
claiming “an entitlement to an accommodation that remedies their
economic status” rather than their disabilities.214 The Salute majority
deemed it “fundamental that the law addresses the accommodation of
handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be
correlated with having handicaps,” 215 concluding that the FHA-RA
mandate “does not elevate the rights of the handicapped poor over the
rights of the non-handicapped poor.”216
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit took a decidedly different
approach in Giebeler v. M & B Associates.217 The landlord there did
not refuse vouchers, but it did require prospective tenants to have a
gross income of at least three times the monthly rent, a standard that
the plaintiff, who received SSDI and other disability benefits and
support from his mother, could not meet. 218 The plaintiff’s mother
offered to rent the apartment or serve as a co-signer for her son, but
the landlord rejected this proposal, citing a policy against allowing cosigners on leases, and then refused to waive this policy as an
accommodation for the plaintiff.219 The district court granted summary
judgment for the landlord on the plaintiff’s FHA-RA claim,220 but the
Ninth Circuit reversed in an opinion that specifically “reject[ed] the
are not required by the [FHA]’s reasonable accommodation
provision.
Id. at 300–01 (citation omitted). Judge Calabresi, on the other hand,
argued that the FHA-RA analysis required a fact-based balancing of both
the landlord’s and the disabled applicants’ interests. Id. at 311 (Calabresi,
J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 301–02 (majority opinion).
215. Id. at 301.
216. Id. at 302 (“Congress could not have intended the [FHA] to require
reasonable accommodations for those with handicaps every time a neutral
policy imposes an adverse impact on individuals who are poor . . . .
Economic discrimination—such as the refusal to accept Section 8
tenants—is not cognizable as a failure to make reasonable
accommodations, in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(B).”).
The dissent noted that the plaintiffs claimed “their disabilities prevent
them from working, which necessarily makes them poor,” and thus they
rely on Section 8 “as a direct result of their handicap.” Id. at 310
(Calabresi, J., dissenting).
217. 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).
218. Id. at 1145.
219. Id. at 1145–46.
220. Id. at 1146. In addition, the district court allowed the plaintiff’s disabilityintent claim to proceed, but dismissed his other claims. Id. Thereafter,
the parties settled all claims except for the FHA-RA one, the dismissal of
which plaintiff appealed. Id. at 1146 n.1.
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reasoning of Salute.”221 The appellate court reasoned that “Giebeler’s
request that he be permitted to reside in an apartment rented by his
financially qualified mother is a request for an accommodation
that . . . he was entitled to receive,” provided two other key elements
of a FHA-RA claim were met.222 The Ninth Circuit ruled that they
were, holding that “defendants’ relaxation of their no cosigner policy
‘may be necessary’ to afford Giebeler equal opportunity” in housing223
and that the requested accommodation was “reasonable.”224 The court
concluded: “Giebeler’s modest request that his financially qualified
mother be allowed to rent an apartment for him to live in, affording
him the opportunity to live in a suitable dwelling despite his
disability, . . . should have been honored.”225
Although the RA requested in Giebeler differed from the one in
Salute,226 the two opinions reflect a fundamental disagreement about
221. Id. at 1154, 1159.
222. Id. at 1155.
223. Id. at 1156.
224. Id. at 1156–59. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the purpose of the defendants’ “minimum income requirement is to ensure
that tenants have sufficient income to pay rent consistently and promptly.
This interest is, of course, considerable.” Id. at 1157. But the court held
that this interest is protected so long as someone can meet the financial
requirements on the tenant’s behalf:
[A]llowing a financially eligible relative to rent an apartment for
a disabled individual who, except for his current financial
circumstances, is qualified to be a tenant does not unreasonably
threaten this interest. The rental arrangement requested by
Giebeler would not require [defendant] Branham to accept less
rent, would not otherwise alter the essential obligations of tenancy
at Branham (such as appropriate behavior and care of the
premises), and would provide a lessee with the proper financial
qualifications and credit history.
Id.; see also id. at 1159 (noting that “Giebeler was in no way trying to
avoid payment of the usual rent for the apartment he wanted to live in,
nor was he proposing to leave [defendants] without a means of ascertaining
that an individual with the means to pay that rent would be responsible
for doing so”).
225. Id. at 1159.
226. The court noted that the RAs differed in two potentially significant ways:
In Salute, the accommodation requested was waiver of an established
policy against accepting vouchers under Section 8 . . . as payment for
the rent. Salute emphasized that Congress had recognized the considerable
bureaucratic entanglement entailed by Section 8 and consequently
included in Section 8 an explicit policy against compelling landlords to
accept Section 8 tenants. Here, conversely, the [FHA] . . . appears
affirmatively to protect arrangements whereby a disabled person lives in
an apartment rented by another.

614

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

how to evaluate a FHA-RA claim involving a prospective tenant’s
source of financial support. Courts outside the Second and Ninth
Circuit are divided over which approach to follow.227
5. Intentional Discrimination Claims

Some of the cases discussed in the previous sections have also
upheld claims of intentional discrimination based on race or other FHAprohibited factors. 228 Evidence of such discrimination in source-ofincome cases may take either of two forms. First, to the extent that the
defendant’s policy is shown to have an unjustified negative impact on
minorities, this fact may be an indicator of the defendant’s illegal intent
under the familiar analysis of Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.229 An example is Williams v.
City of Antioch,230 where a California municipality’s hostility to Section
8 users was alleged to be race-based.231 Second, a defendant’s source-ofincome policy may be shown to have been applied in a discriminatory
manner (e.g., black Section 8 users were rejected while comparable
whites were accepted). In Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding

Additionally, unlike the tenants in Salute, Giebeler proffered a
proposed lessee, Ann Giebeler, who more than met the economic
qualifications required to rent at [defendants’ property] and demanded no
special, burdensome rights as a condition of her tenancy. In contrast, the
Salute court was concerned that “participation in a federal program will
or may entail financial audits, maintenance requirements, increased risk
of litigation, and so on.”
Id. at 1158 n.12 (citations omitted).
227. Compare Fair Hous. Rights Ctr. in Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Morgan
Props. Mgmt. Co., No. 16-4677, 2018 WL 3208159 (E.D. Pa. June 29,
2018), with Batista v. Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio,
776 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2015). Cf. Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P’ship,
783 N.W.2d 171, 180–81 (Minn. App. 2010) (rejecting, as not
“reasonable,” disabled tenant’s RA request that defendant-landlord
accept plaintiff’s Section 8 voucher).
228. See cases cited supra notes 161–162, 167–168, 181, 187, 195–196.
229. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266–67 (1977) (explaining that discriminatory intent in an Equal
Protection claim may be proved in part with evidence that the defendant’s
action had a discriminatory effect). Courts have often applied this analysis
in FHA-intent cases. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:12 n.13 and
accompanying text.
230. No. C 08-02301 SBA, 2010 WL 3632197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010).
231. Id. at *1–2 (certifying class-action suit asserting both a race-based impact
claim for defendants’ alleged harassment of local Section 8 renters and an
intent claim alleging that this harassment was directed particularly
toward African-Americans).
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Corp., 232 for example, the court enjoined a landlord’s anti-voucher
policy based on the policy’s racial impact, and also noted that the
defendant’s harsher application of this policy to the two black plaintiffs
suggested intentional racial discrimination.233
6. Summary: Mixed Results

Numerous FHA decisions dealing with source-of-income claims have
been reported over the past thirty years. Many have survived motions
to dismiss or summary judgment motions, and some of these have
resulted in substantial settlements for the plaintiffs. Others have failed,
some because of the absence of necessary proof and some because the
courts took a different view of the proper standards to apply in such
FHA claims. Taken together, these decisions provide examples both of
the FHA’s ability to challenge landlords’ policies that oppose vouchers
and other non-traditional sources of income and of its failure to
eliminate those policies.

III. Amending the FHA: Arguments For and Against
A. Overview

Many of the arguments both in favor of and opposed to amending
the FHA to prohibit source-of-income discrimination have already been
identified in the debates and court opinions dealing with state and local

232. 724 F. Supp. 148, 157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
233. Regarding the evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent, the court
noted:
[D]efendant’s inconsistent articulation and application of its
tenant selection policies cast the sincerity of those policies in a
somewhat questionable light. Throughout the course of their
application process, for example, plaintiffs were never made aware
of Crestwood’s triple income test. It was not until well after she
had submitted her credit check application, moreover, that
Bronson was informed of Crestwood’s Section 8 policy.
Carter . . . was never told that such a policy existed. Indeed,
defendant’s post hoc objections to the Section 8 lease were,
themselves, never articulated until after the Temporary
Restraining Order hearing, although Crestwood was certainly
given an opportunity to present such objections . . . . Moreover,
despite these very objections, it does in fact appear that
Crestwood currently rents apartment units to four Section 8
recipients. It is not insignificant that all four of these tenants are
white.
Id. A later decision in this case held that the defendant’s anti-voucher
policy also violated the FHA’s prohibition of familial-status
discrimination. See Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp.,
746 F. Supp. 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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laws that have previously taken this step.234 As the variety of these laws
shows, the first step in considering their pros and cons is to determine
how broadly the ban on this type of discrimination should apply; that
is, does it cover just voucher holders in rental situations or does it
extend to all types of source-of-income discrimination in a full range of
housing-related transactions? The FHA, of course, is not limited to
rental transactions.
As for the voucher-only versus all-types-of-income issue, proposals
to amend the FHA have included both versions, 235 but the leading
proposals call for a broad amendment that bans all source-of-income
discrimination and specifically includes vouchers within its definition of
this term.236 A related issue—one that the states have taken different
approaches to—is whether such an amendment should allow landlords
to rely on their antagonism to voucher-program requirements as a
defense in a voucher-holder-discrimination claim.237 For the purposes of
this discussion, we will assume that the FHA amendment under
consideration provides for the broadest possible coverage, including
explicitly foreclosing such a defense.
B. Arguments For

A number of goals have been articulated for the various state and
local source-of-income laws. Their basic objective is “to curb discrim–
ination against individuals paying rent with non-traditional sources.”238
Relatedly, they aim to increase the success rate of low-income families
who use government vouchers in obtaining housing.239 This, in turn,
would lead to the de-concentration of poverty and more economically
234. See supra Part I.C.
235. See infra app. III.
236. See id.
237. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
238. Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher
Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair
Housing Act, 98 Geo. L. J. 769, 778 (2010); see also Franklin Tower One,
L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1106 (N.J. 1999) (noting that New Jersey’s
source-of-income-law’s purpose was “to protect from housing
discrimination welfare recipients, spouses dependent on alimony and child
support payments and tenants receiving governmental rental assistance”).
239. See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 86, at 11–12 (noting a lower
voucher-denial rate in jurisdictions with voucher non-discrimination
laws); Bell et al., supra note 97, at 1 (“Voucher non-discrimination
laws appear to be associated with substantial reductions in the share of
landlords that refuse to accept vouchers.”); J. Rosie Tighe et al., Source
of Income Discrimination and Fair Housing Policy, 32 J. Plan. Lit. 3,
8 (2017) (“Early research shows promise for SOI antidiscrimination laws
both increasing the likelihood of HCV recipients finding a place to live
and moving to a higher-opportunity neighborhood.”).
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mixed neighborhoods, 240 because voucher holders would not be
relegated to high-poverty, low-opportunity areas. 241 Stated more
broadly, barring source-of-income discrimination is designed to provide
greater opportunities generally for low-income individuals, giving them
more housing choices and making it more likely they will obtain decent
homes.242
In addition, these laws outlaw a form of discrimination that
disproportionately harms many of the classes protected by existing fair
housing laws.243 This is particularly true of racial minorities,244 which
means that banning source-of-income discrimination would advance the
FHA’s goals of reducing racial discrimination and barriers to residential
integration.245 An analogous situation occurred in 1988 when Congress
added “familial status” to the FHA’s prohibited bases of discrimination,
which was done in part because discrimination against families with
children was being used as a proxy for racial and national-origin
discrimination.246 Other FHA-protected groups would also benefit from
240. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d 749, 753 (W.D. Tex.
2018) (noting that one of the Austin ordinance’s purposes was to prevent
“relegat[ing] voucher holders to lower opportunity areas of the City”); see
also Daniel, supra note 238, at 784.
242. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs.,
739 A.2d 238, 248 (Conn. 1999) (noting that Connecticut’s law was
“designed to provide that low income families ‘may not be rejected or
denied a full and equal opportunity’” for housing based on their lawful
source of income); see also Daniel, supra note 238, at 784.
243. See, e.g., Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 753 (noting that one of the Austin
ordinance’s purposes was to prevent a practice that “disproportionately
impacts minority residents, children, and the disabled”); see also Austin
K. Hampton, Vouchers as Veils, 1 U. Chi. Legal F. 503, 525 (2009)
(concluding that “mak[ing] actionable the practice of refusing housing
choice vouchers . . . ensures that the protected classes currently defined
are not discriminated against under the veil of [voucher]
nonparticipation”).
244. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights, supra note 143 (reporting
that landlords who advertise “No Section 8” are more likely to discriminate
against African-American renters); Michael Lepley & Lenore
Mangiarelli, The Housing Ctr., Housing Voucher Discrimination
and Race Discrimination in Cuyahoga County 20 (2017) (reporting the
same), available at http://www.thehousingcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/Voucher-and-Race-Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF9GEEFN].
245. See, e.g., Lepley & Mangiarelli, supra note 244, at 9–10 (reporting
that the majority of voucher holders are concentrated in racially
segregated areas).
246. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 21 (1988), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2182 (describing FHA cases in which defendants
accused of racial discrimination claimed that they refused to deal with the
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outlawing source-of-income discrimination, particularly disabled
persons, women, and families with children.247
Adding source-of-income as a prohibited basis of discrimination
would also help resolve a number of FHA issues that have divided the
courts. One prominent example is the Salute/Geibeler dispute over
whether a landlord’s discriminatory source-of-income policy should be
waived in favor of a disabled tenant’s reasonable-accommodation
claim;248 banning source-of-income discrimination would allow disabled
tenants to prevail in this situation without having to litigate a RA
request. Similarly, the need for impact-based claims as a predicate to a
source-of-income challenge would end, thereby eliminating a type of
claim that has produced mixed judicial responses.249 Other FHA issues
would also be clarified or resolved, such as whether a landlord’s
announced “No Section 8” policy violates the statute’s ban on
discriminatory ads and statements.250
C. Arguments Against

The main push-back against a source-of-income amendment is
likely to come from rental-housing providers, who have been the target
of most source-of-income claims.251 In particular, landlords have often
objected to their forced participation in the “voluntary” Section 8
program, 252 which they see as imposing a variety of bureaucratic
difficulties and costs on them.253 A number of courts have endorsed
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs had children); 134 Cong. Rec. H4688
(daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Jeffords Dellums) (noting
that one purpose of the familial-status amendment was to eliminate a
form of discrimination that has a negative effect on black and Latino
households and that “is often used as a smokescreen to exclude minorities
from housing”).
247. See supra Part II.B.3.
248. See supra notes 210–227 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part II.B.2–.3.
250. See infra Part IV.C.
251. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Cunningham et al.,
supra note 86, at 10–12 (noting that a significant percentage of landlords
oppose participating in the voucher program).
253. See, e.g., Philip Garboden et al., Johns Hopkins U. Poverty &
Ineq. Res. Lab, Urban Landlords and the Housing Choice
Voucher Program 26–31 (2018), available at https://www.huduser.gov/
portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Urban-Landlords-HCV-Program.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WM6N-7DRV] (recounting some of the difficulties for landlords
in participating in the Section 8 program); Lepley & Mangiarelli,
supra note 244, at 7 (reporting that over 50% of the landlords who
participated in the voucher program “reported dissatisfaction with [it]”).
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their objections. 254 For example, in 2017, a federal judge in Texas
rejected a FHA race-impact challenge to a landlord’s anti-voucher
policy, noting that the defendant’s desires to avoid Section 8’s
“regulatory requirements” and to not “be subjected to increased costs,
administrative delays for payment, and various other financial risks,”
along with “the possibility of increased litigation,” all were “substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”255
Some of these concerns can be discounted. For one thing, the FHA’s
exemptions for single-family and “Mrs. Murphy” landlords, 256 who
account for almost half of all units rented in the United States,257 mean
that these exempt housing providers would not be subject to a FHA
ban on source-of-income discrimination.258 Further, those landlords who
are covered by the FHA would not thereby be required to participate
in the Section 8 program. As courts construing state and local sourceof-income laws have noted: “Landlords remain free not to rent to
voucher holders provided they do so on other legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds, such as an applicant’s rental history or criminal
history.” 259 Indeed, given the HCV program’s ceiling on assistance

254. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 213.
255. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., No. 3:17-CV-206-K,
2017 WL 2984048, at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2017), aff’d, 920 F.3d 890
(5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020).
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2012) (providing exemptions under certain
circumstances for single-family-home rentals and for units in buildings
where the owner lives and that contain four or fewer units).
257. See Joint Ctr. for Housing Studies of Harvard Univ., America’s
Rental Housing 2017, at 14 (2017) (reporting that single-family homes
make up 39% of the nation’s rental units and another 18% are located in twoto four-unit multifamily buildings), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housing_2017_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9F5-LG6B].
258. These exempt landlords would, however, be subject to the ban on
discriminatory advertising and statements in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:1 nn.10–11 and accompanying text.
For more on the FHA’s ban on such ads and statements, see infra Part
IV.C.
259. Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citing Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 330
(Md. 2007)); see also Waller, supra note 100, at 433 (noting that “the
realities of the Section 8 program [are such that] landlords may still reject
tenants for non-discriminatory reasons”).
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payments, 260 landlords whose units rent for higher amounts would
simply be beyond the reach of voucher users.261
And housing providers who do participate in the HCV program
enjoy some benefits that might at least partly offset the perceived
burdens. Voucher holders are incentivized to maintain their vouchers
and to pay rent on time, and the government-assisted rent payments
are reliable.262 Further, participating landlords remain free to charge
their regular rents, security deposits, and other fees, and can use their
regular screening criteria regarding tenant history. 263 Such landlords
can also evict voucher users for “good cause,” just as they do all other
tenants.264

260. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Bourbeau, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 87; see also Waller, supra note
100, at 433 (“[I]f a unit’s fair market value rent exceeds the area median,
the property is too expensive for a Section 8 recipient and the landlord
may not participate in the program.”). This assumes that landlords charge
higher rents on a non-discriminatory basis; that is, not just to voucher
users—a practice that would, of course, violate a ban on source-of-income
discrimination. See id.
An additional issue is whether a landlord could set rents too high for
voucher users just to avoid dealing with them. Some FHA decisions have
found a defendant liable when he used otherwise legitimate economic
methods to block a protected-class-member’s opportunity to obtain
housing. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass’n, 685 F.2d 184,
187 (7th Cir. 1982); see also infra note 286. As the Sixth Circuit recently
noted: “The existence of economic . . . motivations does not protect the
defendants from housing discrimination claims when their actions had a
clear discriminatory effect. Economic motivation does not cleanse
discrimination.” Linkletter v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., Inc., 851 F.3d 632, 640
(6th Cir. 2017); see also infra Part IV.G.3 (discussing the implications of
a source-of-income amendment on gentrification, e.g., by landlords who
raise rents after upgrading their properties).
262. See Bell et al., supra note 97, at 13–14; see also Hampton, supra note
243, at 525 (noting that landlords that participate in the voucher program
benefit from having “an increased pool of available tenants” and a
“guarantee of income” by the government).
263. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 97, at 12–13.
264. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1) (2018). “Good cause” to evict a tenant
includes:
(i) Failure by the family to accept the offer of a new lease or
revision;
(ii) A family history of disturbance of neighbors or destruction of
property, or of living or housekeeping habits resulting in damage
to the unit or premises;
(iii) The owner’s desire to use the unit for personal or family use,
or for a purpose other than as a residential rental unit; or
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Still, landlords faced with a national mandate not to discriminate
against voucher holders would no doubt incur some additional costs
and burdens.265 Would this provide a defense to a FHA claim based on
refusing to rent to such tenants? Stated another way: would a landlord
violate the FHA if her refusal was prompted by both an outlawed reason
(e.g., source of income) and a legitimate one (e.g., avoiding regulatory
burdens)? The problem is exacerbated by the fact that this “mixed
motive” issue, historically, has been a difficult one in FHA cases, and
it remains so today.266
As noted above, the administrative-burden defense has been
addressed a number of times and in different ways by states and
localities with source-of-income laws.267 Their courts have generally not
allowed such a defense, because to allow it would create such a large
exception as to essentially nullify these laws.268 A FHA amendment
would presumably need to do the same, 269 both to avoid needless
litigation under the new mandate and to allow the law to fully achieve
its goal of banning discrimination against voucher-assisted families.
(iv) A business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy
(such as sale of the property, renovation of the unit, or desire to
lease the unit at a higher rental).
Id.
265. See supra notes 213, 255 and accompanying text.
266. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:3 nn.23–37 and accompanying text.
Congress, in the 1991 amendments to Title VII, clarified the mixed-motive
issue for employment discrimination cases, but not for cases brought
under other statutes, thereby leaving the FHA standard for this type of
case uncertain. See id. § 10:3 n.25 and accompanying text; see also Gross
v. FML Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (declining to apply Title
VII’s amended mixed-motive standard to a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
267. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
268. See cases cited supra note 107. Other cases rejecting landlords’
administrative-burden defenses in source-of-income claims based on state
and local laws include Cales v. New Castle Hill Realty, No. 10 Civ.
3426(DAB), 2011 WL 335599, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (New York
City law), and Diaz v. Wykurz, CCHR No. 07-H-28 (Dec. 16, 2009)
(Chicago law). See generally Armen H. Merijan, Attempted Nullification:
The Administrative Burden Defense in Source of Income Discrimination
Cases, 22 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 211, 212–13 (2015) (arguing
that allowing an administrative-burden defense would effectively nullify
source-of-income laws).
269. One way this could be done is by adding language to the FHA’s definition
of source-of-income discrimination similar to that adopted by
Massachusetts in 1990, which prohibits discrimination “because of any
requirement of such public assistance, rental assistance, or housing
subsidy program.” See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d
421, 428–29 (Mass. 2007).
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While the advantages of explicitly dealing with this issue in an amended
FHA are apparent, doing so would likely create even more opposition
from the housing-provider community. At the very least, therefore, a
FHA amendment should be accompanied by congressional and HUD
efforts that make the Section 8-participation burdens less onerous on
landlords.270
In addition to administrative burdens, landlords may object to
participating in the Section 8 program based on its perceived added
costs.271 To the extent the added financial burdens are real, a landlord
would presumably be able to try to recoup those costs by charging
higher rents. This would, of course, have to be done across the board
for all tenants, not just for those using vouchers.272 If banning sourceof-income discrimination would, in fact, result in higher rent levels and
thus possibly a net loss of affordable-housing units, 273 a legitimate
policy issue would be raised. But this added-cost issue has not been a
major concern in cities and states that have already banned source-ofincome discrimination, and assuming otherwise at the national level is
speculative at this stage. Moreover, Congress has previously shown
itself willing to impose some modest costs on housing providers when
adding new protected classes to the FHA.274

IV. An Amended Fair Housing Act – Implications and
Applications
The Fair Housing Act “prohibits a wide range of conduct” and is a
“far reaching [statute that] . . . takes aim at discrimination that might
be found throughout the real estate market and throughout the process
270. See, e.g., Nisar et al., supra note 86, at 23–44 (identifying the primary
reasons that landlords choose not to participate in the voucher program,
and potential improvements to that program to address these reasons,
such as increased payment standards, security-deposit assistance,
streamlined inspections, and education programs).
271. See id. at 23–24. A third concern—having to deal with low-income
tenants—is less important, and, in any event, would be illegal under a
source-of-income amendment to the FHA. See id. at 29.
272. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 260–261 and accompanying text.
274. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:8 n.13 and accompanying text
(regarding the reasonable-accommodation requirement in disability
cases); H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (regarding the accessibility requirements in
disability cases); cf. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 210–11 (1991) (interpreting Title VII’s ban on gender discrimination
as not allowing for an extra-cost defense except perhaps in “a case in
which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the
employer’s business”).
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of buying, maintaining, or selling a home.” 275 This Part reviews
potential applications of a FHA amendment that would add source-ofincome (including vouchers and other forms of governmental assistance)
to the statute’s prohibited bases of discrimination. Separate sections
cover: (A) refusals to rent and landlords’ other discriminatory practices;
(B) exclusionary-zoning policies and other local-government land-use
restrictions on affordable housing; (C) discriminatory ads, notices, and
statements; (D) sales, mortgage, and home-insurance discrimination;
(E) harassment and retaliation; and (F) other applications and issues.
A. Rental Discrimination
1. Overview

As noted above, claims based on state and local housing laws that
ban source-of-income discrimination have been brought, almost
exclusively, against landlords and their agents.276 Also, experience in
cities with such laws shows that they are not a panacea for this type of
discrimination, as substantial non-compliance by housing providers
continues years after the law’s enactment. 277 This may not be
surprising, in light of the widespread racial discrimination that still
occurs in rental markets decades after the FHA’s passage in 1968.278
Another, more optimistic experience is suggested by the 1988 FHA
amendment banning familial status discrimination, 279 which initially
resulted in large numbers of rental complaints, but has since settled
into a period of modest litigation that involves mainly a few recurring
issues.280 As in the racial and familial-status areas, compliance with a

275. City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1278–79 (11th Cir.
2019), vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020).
276. See supra Part II.A.1.
277. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
280. In the early 1990s, familial status was the second-most frequently claimed
basis of discrimination in FHA complaints to fair-housing agencies,
accounting for 35.4% of the total claims in FY 1992, 26.2% in FY 1993,
and 24.7% in FY 1994. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev.,
Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity Annual Report
to Congress 14 (1996). In recent years, however, familial-status claims
have accounted for just over 10% of total claims. See HUD 2017 Report,
supra note 58, at 15 (10.6% in FY 2017); U.S. Dep’t of Housing &
Urban Dev., Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
Annual Report to Congress 25 (2016) (12.5% in FY 2015, and 12.4%
in FY 2014).
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national source-of-income law will likely take some years of litigation
and other enforcement and educational efforts.281
Source-of-income cases against landlords fall into two categories:
(1) those in which the landlord admits its source-of-income discrim–
ination, but tries to justify the practice; and (2) those in which a
landlord denies the charge.282 The latter cases can present a variety of
prohibited practices under the FHA, but all of them are governed by
well-established principles developed over decades of FHA litigation
involving other protected classes;283 the former requires a more detailed
consideration of FHA law.
2. Landlord Justifications for Admitted Source-of-Income Discrimination

This type of case would involve facially illegal discrimination, with
the litigation focusing on whether the landlord’s justification provides
a legally sufficient defense. A key issue will be whether the FHA’s
source-of-income ban includes an explicit provision outlawing a “costand-administrative burden” defense in voucher cases; if it does not, as
noted above, a good deal of litigation may be expected over this issue.284
Even if the amended FHA resolves this particular issue, housing
providers may assert other justifications for continuing to engage in
source-of-income discrimination. Again, it is worth noting that, in this
type of case, it will be easy to prove intentional (“disparate treatment”)
discrimination. As Judge Posner pointed out some thirty years ago,285
281. See Nisar et al., supra note 86, at 32–38; see also Memorandum
Regarding Source of Income Protections Under Cook County Human
Rights Ordinance from Ranjit Hakin, supra note 147.
282. See supra Part II.A.2.
283. See supra notes 146–155 and accompanying text. This includes
discriminatory-effect claims, more about which is discussed infra Part
IV.G.2.
284. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 107–108, 268.
A compromise is also possible, as demonstrated by Congress’s decision in
the 1988 Fair Housing Amendment Act, which added disability and
familial status to the FHA’s protected classes and provided a narrow
exemption for each of these two newly outlawed bases of discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2012) (providing a “direct threat” defense in
disability cases); id. § 3607(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (exempting “housing for
older persons” from the familial status provisions). In both of these
situations, courts have made clear that the exemptions are to be construed
narrowly and that a defendant has the burden of showing its situation
comes within the exemption. See infra note 297 and accompanying text;
Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:3 nn.21–22 and accompanying text
(regarding the “direct threat” defense); id. § 11E:5 n.5 and accompanying
text (regarding the “housing for older persons” defense).
285. Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
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a FHA defendant who acts on the basis of a forbidden factor has
engaged in intentional discrimination, even if he has no malice toward
the group involved and even if his motivation for such discrimination
is economic.286
Thus, a would-be tenant who is rejected because he uses a housing
voucher will be able to prove “disparate treatment through explicit
facial discrimination.”287 The court will not have to focus on whether
the defendant’s obvious discrimination deprived the plaintiff of a
housing opportunity,288 but only on whether the defendant can justify
it.
Note that the defendant’s opportunity here is different from that in
disparate-impact claims, where a FHA violation is not established until
286. According to Judge Posner’s opinion in Dwivedi:
Suppose a merchant refuses to hire black workers not because he
is racist but because he believes that his customers do not like
blacks and will take their business elsewhere if he hires any. The
refusal is nevertheless discrimination, because it is treating people
differently on account of their race. It is intentional
discrimination, because it necessarily is based on the merchant’s
awareness of racial difference and his decision to base employment
decisions on that awareness. And it is actionable discrimination,
regardless of its effects and notwithstanding the merchant’s own
freedom from racial animus.
The parallel in [the Fair Housing Act] . . . is the broker who refuses
to show the customer a property in which the customer is
interested and does so not because he dislikes persons of the
customer’s race but because he fears being boycotted by persons
of a different race if he refuses to abide by the community’s racial
mores. Such a broker is discriminating against his customer on
grounds of race and therefore violates the statute.
Id. at 1530–31; see also Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting that a FHA plaintiff may prove intentional
discrimination “merely by showing that a protected group has been
subjected to explicitly differential—i.e., discriminatory—treatment,” and
that she is not required to prove the defendant’s conduct was motivated
by “malice or discriminatory animus”); cf. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting
that a defendant’s illegal intent could be shown “even if all of the evidence
showed that cost-savings, not animus . . . , motivated the company”).
287. Cornerstone Residence, Inc. v. City of Clairton, 754 F. App’x 89, 91–92
(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421
F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2005)); accord Curto v. A Country Place Condo.
Ass’n, Inc., 921 F.3d 405, 410 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] showing of malice is
not required ‘where a plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged action
involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination . . . .
Rather, the focus is on the explicit terms of the discrimination.’”) (quoting
Wind Gap, 421 F.3d at 177) (alteration in original).
288. See Cornerstone Residence, 754 F. App’x at 91–92.
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the court evaluates the landlord’s proffered justification. 289 Indeed,
regarding intentional-discrimination claims based on race and some
other FHA-prohibited factors, it is not clear that a defendant can ever
prevail through a justification defense.290
Still, in FHA cases based on familial status and disability, some
courts have held that, in limited circumstances, defendants may be able
to justify their facially discriminatory rules.291 For example, some FHA
cases involving challenges to landlords’ rules that restrict children have
recognized a “legitimate safety concerns” defense.292
The Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Bangerter v. Orem City
Corp.293 is instructive on this point. There, in the course of reviewing a
city’s facially discriminatory restrictions on group homes for disabled
persons, the court opined that these restrictions might be justified if
they were shown to be either required by “public safety” or “benign
discrimination” favoring the disabled residents. 294 As to the “public
safety” defense, the court noted that the FHA explicitly addresses
safety concerns in disability cases by providing that housing need not
be “made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose
tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of
others.” 295 According to the Tenth Circuit, this provision permits
landlords to impose “reasonable restrictions on the terms or conditions
of housing when justified by public safety concerns,”296 but, like all
289. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522–24 (2015).
290. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d) (2017) (explaining in a HUD regulation
governing FHA-impact claims that “[a] demonstration that a practice is
supported by a legally sufficient justification . . . may not be used as a
defense against a claim of intentional discrimination”); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012) (providing that a defendant’s “demonstration that
an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used
as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination”).
291. See Curto, 921 F.3d at 412 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (noting that the
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits found that “in certain circumstances,
there may be legal justifications for facial discrimination under the
FHA”).
292. See, e.g., Belcher v. The Grand Reserve MGM, No. 2:15-CV-834-KS-WC,
2019 WL 469900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2019) (upholding defendantlandlord’s rules that facially discriminated against families with children,
because they were prompted by “legitimate safety concerns”); see also
Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11E:2 n.27.
293. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
294. Id. at 1503.
295. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (1994)).
296. Id.
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other exceptions to the FHA, it “should be narrowly construed.”297 As
to the possible “benign discrimination” defense, the Tenth Circuit
opined that the FHA “should not be interpreted to preclude special
restrictions upon the disabled that are really beneficial to, rather than
discriminatory against, the handicapped.” 298 Yet the court also
cautioned against a wholesale acceptance of this defense: “We should
be chary about accepting the justification that a particular restriction
upon the handicapped really advances their housing opportunities
rather than discriminates against them in housing.”299 Beyond these
possible “public safety” and “benign discrimination” justifications,
Bangerter left open the possibility that other defenses based on such
benign motives might also be permissible.300
297. Id. Thus:
Restrictions predicated on public safety cannot be based on
blanket stereotypes about the handicapped, but must be tailored
to particularized concerns about individual residents . . . .
“Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded
speculations about threats to safety are specifically rejected as
grounds to justify exclusion.” [H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 18
(1988).] Any special requirements placed on housing for the
handicapped based on concerns for the protection of the disabled
themselves or the community must be “individualiz[ed . . . to the
needs or abilities of particular kinds of developmental disabilities,”
Marbrunak, Inc., v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1992),
and must have a “necessary correlation to the actual abilities of
the persons upon whom it is imposed,” Pontiac [Grp. Home Corp.
v. Montgomery Cty., 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (D. Md. 1993)].
Id. at 1503–04. The court did not opine as to whether a defendant accused
of intentional disability discrimination could successfully assert “safety
concerns” that go beyond those covered by § 3604(f)(9). Id. at 1503.
298. Id. at 1504.
299. Id. Explaining its caution, the Tenth Circuit noted:
Restrictions that are based upon unsupported stereotypes or upon
prejudice and fear stemming from ignorance or generalizations, for
example, would not pass muster. However, restrictions that are
narrowly tailored to the particular individuals affected could be
acceptable under the [FHA] if the benefit to the handicapped in
their housing opportunities clearly outweigh whatever burden may
result to them.
Id. On the “benign discrimination” point, the court concluded by
recognizing “the importance of leaving room for flexible solutions to
address the complex problem of discrimination and to realize the goals
established by Congress in the Fair Housing Act.” Id. at 1505.
300. Id. at 1503 (noting that the “public safety” and “benign discrimination”
defenses were among the “potential justifications [that] seem relevant for
inquiry here”); see also Larkin v. Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285,
290 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that facially discriminatory restrictions on
housing for disabled persons violate the FHA unless justified “by the
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B. Exclusionary Zoning

Throughout the FHA’s history, a key part of its litigation has
involved challenges to local governments’ zoning and other land-use
restrictions on affordable housing.301 In its 2015 decision endorsing the
FHA’s disparate-impact theory of liability, the Supreme Court referred
to these cases as being “at the heartland of” of this theory.302 The gist
of FHA law is that a local government cannot block housing of
particular value to minorities if that action is motivated by race or has
an unjustified racial effect.303 And because the 1988 amendments to the
FHA banned disability discrimination, the same principles have been
applied in numerous cases challenging municipal restrictions on group
homes for people with disabilities.304

unique and specific needs and abilities” of people with disabilities)
(quoting Marbrunak, 974 F.2d at 47).
301. “Affordable housing” is generally understood to mean housing that
“requires no more than 30% of a household’s income for households
earning 80% or less” of the median income in the local metropolitan area.
See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 588 n.1 (2d Cir.
2016).
302. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 (2015) (“Suits targeting unlawful zoning laws and
other housing restrictions that unfairly exclude minorities from certain
neighborhoods without sufficient justification are at the heartland of
disparate-impact liability.”); see also id. at 2521–22 (explaining that
FHA-outlawed practices “include zoning laws and other housing
restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain
neighborhoods without any sufficient justification”).
303. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Props. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 908 (5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020) (noting that the
“heartland” decisions described by the Supreme Court in Inclusive
Communities “employed the FHA to remove indefensible government
policies that operated to perpetuate segregation by unreasonably
restricting private construction of multi-family housing that would
increase affordable housing options for minorities”); Mhany Mgmt., 819
F.3d at 606–15; Avenue 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493,
503–13 (9th Cir. 2016). See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:8–
:10 (describing FHA exclusionary-zoning claims).
304. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216–18
(11th Cir. 2008); Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 573–
80 (2d Cir. 2003). See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 11D:5 nn.20–
21. In addition to disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims, group
homes may also challenge such restrictions based on the defendant’s duty
to reasonably accommodate housing for disabled persons, a FHA mandate
that does not apply to other protected classes. See, e.g., Schwarz, 544
F.3d at 1218–28; Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 578–580; see also Schwemm,
supra note 11, § 11D:5 n.22.
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But proving a municipality’s discriminatory intent or unjustified
impact is often difficult, and absent such proof, a challenged restriction
is generally upheld.305 Even when a plaintiff ultimately prevails, the
case may take years and millions of dollars to litigate,306 and even then
may not result in the proposed housing actually being built.307 Thus,
while FHA race-based claims challenging municipal restrictions on
affordable housing have often succeeded as a matter of law, they have
not been all that effective in opening up segregated areas of opportunity
to racial minorities. And HUD’s long-delayed efforts to use the FHA’s
“affirmatively furthering” mandate to require local governments to
accept more affordable housing has now been derailed by the Trump
Administration.308
How would a source-of-income amendment to the FHA affect this
type of litigation? A typical claim accuses a town of illegal
discrimination in blocking a proposed multi-family affordable-housing
development. If, for example, the proposal calls for a substantial
number of Section 8 units309 and the developer can show that the town
treated market-rate projects more favorably,310 this would prove at least
a prima facie case of intentional source-of-income discrimination.311 As
305. See, e.g., Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283–
88 (11th Cir. 2006).
306. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 590–91 (describing key events
beginning in 2003 in a 2016 appellate decision); Avenue 6E, 818 F.3d at
498 (describing key events beginning in 2002 in a 2016 appellate decision);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 928
(2d Cir.) (describing the dispute’s key events beginning in 1981 in a 1988
appellate decision); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1977) (describing key events beginning in
1971 in a 1977 appellate decision).
307. See, e.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033,
1037 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1980) (approving
a settlement calling for a different project to be built at an alternative
site adjacent to defendant-village).
308. See Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14, 22–23, 32–
34 (D.D.C. 2018) (describing 2018 HUD directives that effectively blocked
key provisions of HUD’s “Affirmatively Furthering” regulations
promulgated in 2013 by the Obama Administration), motion to amend
denied, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019); see also supra notes 22–23 and
accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 597; Huntington Branch, NAACP,
844 F.2d at 929–31.
310. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216–17
(11th Cir. 2008).
311. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 606–12; see also Schwemm, supra
note 11, §§ 10:2, 11D:5 nn.45–48 and accompanying text.
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in all such intent-based FHA cases, liability would then turn on whether
the defendant-town could articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its
action (e.g., the site chosen for plaintiff’s development is zoned for
single-family homes), and if so, whether this rationale is then shown to
be merely pretextual.312
In most exclusionary-zoning cases, however, the town’s illegal
intent has not been focused on the developer, but rather the people
likely to live in the proposed development, with the town being accused
of hostility to the race or other protected-class status of these
prospective residents.313 Under an amended FHA, the alleged violation
could be based on the future residents’ source of income, as well as their
race, national origin, disability, or familial status.
But having a particular source-of-income is not the same as having
an income low enough to qualify for affordable housing.314 Thus, while
showing that a town discriminated against a proposed low-income
project might demonstrate hostility to the prospective residents’
economic status, it would not necessarily prove discrimination based on
their source of income.315 In other words, establishing an intent-based
FHA violation in such a case would involve the same types of
evidentiary issues that arise in racial-discrimination cases: the plaintiffs
would need to produce additional evidence connecting the defendant’s
hostility to low-income people with a FHA-protected class (e.g.,
statements by town officials or the public that equate low-income
persons with voucher users).316 A source-of-income FHA amendment
would not make this type of intent-based case any easier to win, except
for the fact that local officials and citizens may, at least in the early
years of such an amendment, be less circumspect about making
explicitly hostile remarks about voucher users than racial minorities.317

312. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 612–13; see also Schwemm, supra
note 11, §§ 10:2 nn.49–52 and accompanying text, 11D:5 n.49 and
accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 606–07; Avenue 6E Invs., LLC v.
City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2016).
314. See supra notes 10–12, 68–70, 188, 198, 218–225, 238, 253–261 and
accompanying text.
315. This presumes that the town has not discriminated against the proposed
subsidized development vis-à-vis other affordable, albeit non-subsidized,
multi-family developments. If it has, then its blocking of the subsidized
development might well run afoul of a source-of-income amendment.
316. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 608–10; Avenue 6E, 818 F.3d at 504–
07. See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:12 n.21.
317. Such hostile remarks may include code words for FHA-protected class
members. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 608–11; Avenue 6E, 818
F.3d at 505–07; see also infra note 334 and accompanying text.
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In addition to intent-based claims, the FHA allows for
discriminatory-effect claims in exclusionary-zoning cases based on two
independent theories: (1) that the defendant-town’s action has a
disproportionate impact on minorities or other FHA-protected groups;
and (2) that the action perpetuates residential segregation based on a
FHA-prohibited factor. 318 The former focuses on the fact that the
blocked project would include disproportionate numbers of racial
minorities, families with children, persons with disabilities, and the like.
The success of such a claim depends on statistical proof of this disparate
impact.319 The would also be true under an amended FHA for a claim
that persons whose source of income includes government assistance
might make up a large portion of the development’s residents. In other
words, such a claim’s success, whether based on source-of-income or
some other prohibited factor, would depend on the particular
demographics of the local market for the proposed development.320
A segregative-effect claim also depends on statistical proof, but its
focus is on how the town’s current, segregated population would be
changed by the influx of hitherto underrepresented groups who are
likely to live in the new development.321 At first blush, it might seem
that every rich suburb would be subject to liability under this theory—
regardless of whether it objects to the project just at a particular site
or whether it forbids all multi-family housing—because the project
would introduce at least some low-income people into the town.322 But,
again, this confuses the new residents’ economic status with their source
of income. If, for example, there is no evidence that the newcomers are
likely to have anything but traditional wage-based income (albeit less
than the suburb’s current residents), then their arrival would not
necessarily “integrate” the town vis-à-vis sources of income. Still, if the
proposal itself were for a project-based Section 8 development 323 —
318. See Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 10:6–:7, 13:10.
319. See, e.g., Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App’x
828, 833–36 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment for the city
against FHA disparate-impact claim due to the inadequacy of plaintiff’s
statistical evidence). See generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:6
nn.14–20 and accompanying text (describing the statistical-evidence
requirement for disparate-impact FHA claims and gathering cases).
320. See, e.g., Oviedo Town Ctr., 759 F. App’x at 833–36.
321. See, e.g., Mhany, 819 F.3d at 608, 619–20; Huntington Branch, NAACP
v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–38 (2d Cir.); see also
Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:7 nn.28–30 and accompanying text.
322. See Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 709, 742–43 (2018). See
generally Schwemm, supra note 11, § 10:7 (describing segregative-effect
theory in exclusionary-zoning cases).
323. For a description of project-based Section 8 housing, see supra note 61.
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meaning that all of its residents would be Section 8 users—then a town
that has no or few residents receiving government assistance could not
block such a proposal absent a substantial justification without inviting
a segregative-effect claim.324
C. § 3604(c): Discriminatory Ads, Notices, and Statements

Section 3604(c) of the FHA outlaws housing notices, statements,
and advertisements that indicate a preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on a prohibited factor.325 Some advocates have
tried to use the current law to challenge “No Section 8” policies as
conveying an anti-minority message, but these efforts have generally
failed.326 Obviously, such claims could be sustained under an amended
FHA, as they already have been in states and localities that have
banned “source-of-income” discrimination under their fair-housing
laws. 327 The same would also be true for rental policies that block
would-be tenants based on their use of Social Security, welfare, or other
A noteworthy feature of
government-assistance programs.328
§ 3604(c) is that it applies to all housing ads and statements, even
those by “Mrs. Murphy” and other small landlords who are otherwise
exempt from the FHA.329 This means that such a landlord, although
free to refuse to rent to voucher holders or otherwise discriminate based
324. This would also be true for affordable-housing developers whose funding
source is some other government assistance program. See, e.g., note 84
and accompanying text (describing the LIHTC program).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
326. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 912
(5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020) (affirming dismissal of § 3604(c) claim
alleging that an apartment manager’s ads announcing its “no vouchers”
policy “appeal to the stereotype that because voucher tenants are Black,
voucher tenants are undesirable as tenants and that the exclusion of
voucher households makes the complex a more desirable place for White
non-Hispanic tenants to live”).
327. Examples from the Chicago Commission on Human Relations include Hall
v. Woodgett, CCHR No. 13-H-51, at 3–4 (Oct. 8, 2015) (finding violation
based on landlord’s statement to applicant that she would not be
approved because she used a voucher), and Shipp v. Wagner, CCHR No.
12-H-19, at 2–4 (July 16, 2014) (finding violations based on landlord’s ads
stating “No Section 8” and “Not Section 8 Approved”).
328. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 247–48 (9th Cir.
1997) (welfare benefits); Edwards v. Gene Salter Props., 739 F. App’x
357, 358 (8th Cir. 2018) (SSDI, retirement benefits, and rental income),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1271 (2019); Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., Ltd.,
No. C96–1542C, 1997 WL 1526484, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997)
(Section 8); see also supra text accompanying notes 202 and 206.
329. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:1 n.10 (gathering cases).
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on a prospect’s source-of-income, could not advertise or make
statements to this effect. Further, § 3604(c) covers not only explicitly
discriminatory communications, but also those that would be under–
stood by an ordinary reader or listener to convey a discriminatory
message330—such as a landlord's statements that her units are “not
Section 8 approved” or that she has had “bad experiences with Section
8” in the past—331even if such statements do not result in the landlord
actually following a “No Section 8” policy.332
The fact that § 3604(c) violations do not require explicit references
to the FHA’s protected classes means that code words and phrases
understood to refer to these groups may also be problematic. This was
the plaintiff’s theory in Lincoln Properties, i.e., that “No Section 8”
would be taken to mean racial minorities.333 Adding source-of-income
as a FHA-outlawed basis of discrimination would mean that other
phrases might be understood to refer to this factor and thus violate
§ 3604(c). Examples might include hostile statements about “lowincome people,” “low-income housing,” and “welfare types”; or, on the
other hand, favorable references in ads for “high-class” or “exclusive”
neighborhoods or complexes.334
Could a landlord even inquire about a prospective tenant’s source
of income? In the racial context, courts have opined that § 3604(c) bars
housing providers from asking about a prospect’s race, on the theory
that “[t]here is simply no legitimate reason for considering an

330. See, e.g., Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp., 725 F.3d
571, 577 (6th Cir. 2013); Soules v. U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 967
F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, §§ 15:3
n.4, 15:6 nn.18–21, 15:8 n.2 (gathering cases).
331. See, e.g., Shipp, CCHR No. 12-H-19, at 2–4; Hutchison v. Iftekaruddin,
CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 4–7, 7 n.8 (Feb. 17, 2010) (finding violations based
on landlord’s statements to applicant that “he didn’t think Section 8
would pay for [the unit]” and that a Section 8 inspection “would take at
least three weeks,” as well as his statements to applicant’s representative
that he had “bad experiences with Section 8” in the past).
332. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:9 nn.15–16 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 326 (describing Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln
Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 910 (5th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied,
930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1234 (2020)).
334. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.75 (2018); see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:5
n.4 and accompanying text (noting HUD’s view that words like
“restrictive,” “private,” and “traditional” in housing ads might violate
§ 3604(c) if used in a discriminatory context); cf. Hawkins v. Vill. Green
Holdings Co., CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9 (July 12, 2018) (noting that “use
of code words such as, we do not accept your form of payment, could be
a means of proving” violation of local fair-housing ordinance that bans
source-of-income discrimination).
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applicant’s race.” 335 In an early familial status case, 336 however, the
Second Circuit held that a landlord could ask about the number and
age of a prospect’s children without violating § 3604(c), because there
are situations that might constitute a valid reason for asking such
questions.337 Similarly, a landlord’s mere inquiry about an applicant’s
source of income should not violate § 3604(c), because, as in Soules,
there may be legitimate reasons for this inquiry (e.g., whether the unit
must be government-inspected before rental).338 Still, although such an
inquiry may be justified, context matters,339 and a § 3604(c) violation
may occur if the inquiry is accompanied by negative comments about
the voucher program or a prospect’s other sources of income.340

335. Soules, 967 F.2d at 824 (agreeing that race is never a valid consideration);
see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:9 n.5 (gathering cases).
336. Soules, 967 F.2d 817.
337. Id. at 824. These situations, according to the Soules opinion, might include
“local zoning regulations.” Id. Also:
Conditions in the neighborhood known to be either ideally suited
to or inherently dangerous to occupancy by families with children
might well permit an inquiry about the ages of the family
members. [Thus], standing alone, an inquiry into whether a
prospective tenant has a child does not constitute an FHA
violation.
Id.; see also Schwemm, supra note 11, § 15:9 nn.12–14 and accompanying
text (discussing Soules and other § 3604(c)–statement cases involving
familial status).
338. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., No. 3:17-CV-206-K, 2017 WL 2984048,
at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2017) (referring to the possibility of
“administrative delays for payment” due to the tenant’s receiving certain
forms of government assistance), aff’d, 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir.), reh’g and
reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 1234 (2020).
339. See, e.g., Soules, 967 F.2d at 825 (noting that in § 3604(c)–statement
cases, the context of the defendant’s remarks and the speaker’s intent may
be examined, “not because a lack of design constitutes an affirmative
defense to an FHA violation, but because it helps determine the manner
in which a statement was made and the way an ordinary listener would
have interpreted it”).
340. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Vill. Green Holdings Co., CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9–
10 (July 12, 2018) (finding no violation based on apartment agent’s
comment to Section 8 applicant that her “form of payment” might not be
acceptable, because it was unclear whether this referred to applicant’s
check, money order, or credit or debit card (which would be justified) or
to applicant’s voucher use (which would not)).
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D. Discriminatory Sales, Financing, and Home Insurance

A source-of-income amendment to the FHA seems unlikely to
generate much litigation involving refusals to sell. By definition, the
Section 8 voucher program is limited to rentals, as are most other
government-housing assistance programs.341 It is hard to imagine why
home sellers would care about the source of their buyers’ income (as
opposed to the amount of this income). Indeed, no sales case has been
reported under a state or local source-of-income law or as an impact
claim under the FHA.342
A real estate broker may be concerned about a home-buyer’s ability
to secure a traditional mortgage, and thus may be less inclined to
provide equal service to those using VA or other federal mortgage
assistance. A realtor may also steer clients who rely on Social Security,
AFDC, or other government benefits to less affluent areas, and such
steering would violate an amended FHA.343
Mortgage providers themselves may be inclined to treat welfare
recipients less favorably than traditional wage-earners. Countering this
expectation, however, is the fact that such creditors have for decades
been subject to the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act,344 which has
always banned discrimination not only on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex, but also on the basis that “all or part
of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance
program.”345 Few cases have been reported under this provision,346 but
its mandate has prompted federal regulators to regularly issue guidance
reminding mortgage providers and other creditors of their
responsibilities to treat SSDI and similar sources of income as just as
reliable as wages.347 The very fact that regulators feel the need to issue
such “reminders” suggests that some lenders are likely to run afoul of a

341. See supra Part I.B.
342. See, e.g., Chi. Comm’n on Human Relations, supra note 137 (reporting
no such cases under Chicago’s ban on source-of-income discrimination
during a sixteen-year period ending in 2018).
343. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:5 nn.9–12 and accompanying text
(describing the FHA’s ban on realtor steering).
344. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012).
345. Id. § 1691(a)(1)–(2). The ECOA also outlaws discrimination based on
marital status, age, and the exercising of any right under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. Id. § 1691(a)(1), (3).
346. One interesting example is Laramore v. Ritchie Realty Mgmt. Co., 397
F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2005), where the court rejected a claim against an
apartment manager who refused Section 8 voucher users on the ground
that the ECOA does not apply to residential leases. Id. at 547.
347. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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FHA amended to outlaw source-of-income discrimination in dealing
with individual applicants.348
But the other major type of FHA mortgage litigation—“redlining,”
in which whole neighborhoods are discriminated against because their
residents are mostly members of a protected class—seems an unlikely
candidate for source-of-income litigation. This is because, as noted
above with respect to exclusionary-zoning cases, being poor is not the
same as having a particular source of income.349 Thus, while lenders
may well provide inferior services for home mortgages in poor
neighborhoods, their doing so would not necessarily relate to the sources
of income of those neighborhoods’ residents. And, although making out
a source-of-income impact claim might be possible in this situation,
assembling the necessary statistical support for such a claim would be
no easier—and perhaps harder—than doing so for a race or nationalorigin discrimination claim.
The home-insurance industry has long fought against FHA
coverage, but with limited success.350 By now, it is well established that
the FHA bans insurance discrimination against both individual
protected-class homeowners and minority neighborhoods (“insurance
redlining”). 351 In addition to intent-based claims, plaintiffs have
challenged insurance companies’ policies for having a negative impact
on minorities or minority neighborhoods. Indeed, as noted above,
hostility to the Section 8 program has already prompted some FHA
race-impact claims against insurers that refused to provide coverage for
landlords who rented to voucher users. 352 A source-of-income
amendment to the FHA would make clear the illegality of such policies
without the need for statistical proof of their race-based disparate
impact.

348. Cf. Sisemore v. Master Fin., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (upholding source-of-income claim under California’s fair-housing
law against finance company that refused to finance a home Sisemore
intended to use as a day care).
349. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
350. See Application of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effect Standard
to Insurance, 81 Fed. Reg. 69012 (Oct. 5, 2016); Property Cas. Insurers
Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1031–32 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(describing insurance industry’s objections to being subject to the FHA
and its disparate-impact standard).
351. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 13:15 nn.19–32 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 181–185 and accompanying text.
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F. Harassment and Retaliation

The FHA’s prohibition of discriminatory terms and conditions, in
§ 3604(b), covers housing providers’ harassment of residents.353 Among
other things, this prevents landlords from threatening to evict tenants
because of their or their guests’ protected-class status.354
Further, § 3617, which bans interference with those who exercise
FHA rights, extends the anti-harassment mandate to everyone,
including neighbors and municipalities.355 Hostility to Section 8 users
by up-scale municipalities has been alleged in a number of race-based
FHA cases.356 A FHA source-of-income amendment would make such
harassment practices unlawful without the need for proof of their racebased impact.357
Section 3617 also bans retaliation against persons who file a
discrimination complaint or otherwise engage in FHA-protected
activities.358 Indeed, retaliation claims have grown in popularity to the
point where they now make up the fourth-largest category of FHA
complaints.359
A variety of practices under these anti-harassment and antiretaliation provisions could be challenged under a FHA amendment
353. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 14:3 nn.1–28 and accompanying text; see
also id. § 11C:2 n.36 and accompanying text (gathering sex-harassment
cases under § 3604(b)).
354. See id. § 14:3 n.29 and accompanying text.
355. See id. § 20:3 n.11 and accompanying text.
356. See Complaint at 1–3, Long Island Hous. Services, Inc. v. Vill. of Mastic
Beach, No. 2:15-cv-00629 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017), 2015 WL 4751374
(ultimately settled for $387,500); Cmty. Action League v. City of
Palmdale, No. CV 11-4817 ODW VBKX, 2012 WL 10647285, at *6–7
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (upholding FHA-intent and -impact claims
against two municipalities based on defendants’ hostility to Section 8
tenants); Williams v. City of Antioch, No. C 08–02301 SBA, 2010 WL
3632197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (certifying a class of African-Americans
in Antioch, California who hold Section 8 housing vouchers). See generally
Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare,
and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1540, 1572–81 (2012) (describing police harassment and other
actions undertaken by certain predominantly white California
communities in response to their growing number of Section 8
households).
357. See supra notes 350–352 and accompanying text.
358. See Schwemm, supra note 11, § 20:5 nn.3–5 and accompanying text.
359. See HUD 2017 Report, supra note 58, at 15 (reporting that retaliation
accounted for 10.2% of all FHA complaints received by HUD and
substantially equivalent state and local agencies in FY 2017, making it
the fourth-most frequent complaint of eight categories (after disability,
race, and familial status; before national origin, sex, religion, and color)).
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banning source-of-income discrimination, but all of these cases would
be governed by well-established principles developed over decades of
FHA litigation involving other protected classes. 360 For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that these new opportunities for
litigation would exist and to highlight one example: a landlord could
not evict or threaten to evict a tenant under an amended FHA for
seeking to use a Section 8 voucher or some other housing assistance.361
G. Other Applications
1. Standing to Sue

As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted
standing to sue under the FHA to include not only the direct targets of
a defendant’s unlawful practices, but also a variety of others who are
injured by these practices, including housing providers, fair-housing
organizations, municipalities, and local residents.362 As with much of
modern FHA litigation, suits by fair-housing organizations will likely
be important in enforcing a source-of-income amendment.363 The same
is true for housing providers, at least in those source-of-income claims
that challenge exclusionary land-use practices.364
The most intriguing type of plaintiff in FHA source-of-income cases
would be local residents who, ever since the Supreme Court’s 1972
decision in Trafficante,365 have been allowed to challenge a landlord’s
discrimination against outsiders as a deprivation of their right to live
in an integrated community. Although most of these claims have alleged
racial discrimination, the Trafficante theory has also been used in

360. See supra notes 146–155 and accompanying text; see also infra Part
IV.G.2 (discussing discriminatory-effect claims).
361. Cf. Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 1187–90 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that
would-be foster parents who had not yet been assigned any children may
challenge their eviction based on the FHA’s prohibition of familial-status
discrimination).
362. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
363. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982); see
also supra notes 139, 161, 165, 169, 185, and 190 (discussing cases in which
fair-housing organizations brought source-of-income claims either under a
state or local fair-housing law banning this type of discrimination or as
impact-based claims under the current FHA).
364. See supra Part IV.B.
365. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Havens
Realty, 455 U.S. at 375–78; Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 111–15 (extending Trafficante’s standing rationale to local
residents who challenged realtors' steering).
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familial-status and disability cases. 366 A source-of-income version of
Trafficante would likely see current, affluent resident-plaintiffs
objecting to, say, their landlord’s refusal to rent to Section 8 or other
government-assisted tenants. A variation on this claim, also recognized
in early FHA race cases,367 might be a suit brought by local residents
in an area already heavily populated by voucher users in which the local
residents object to a further influx of subsidized housing as perpetuating
source-of-income segregation.
Among other things, these types of claims under an amended FHA
might succeed in cases similar to Inclusive Communities, where, on
remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs’ challenge to the
disproportionate siting of subsidized projects in poor areas of Dallas
failed as a race-impact claim. 368 The caveat here, as it has been
throughout this Article, is that having a particular source-of-income is
not the same as being low income. Thus, a claim based on local
residents’ being deprived of integrated opportunities or on having
source-of-income segregation reinforced would have to be proved by
showing the benefits of integration not just regarding poorer people,
but regarding people who receive certain sources of income.
2. Discriminatory-Effect Claims; Income-to-Rent Policies

Challenges to a housing practice based on its unjustified
discriminatory effect on a protected class have become a wellestablished part of FHA litigation. In the 1970s, appellate courts began
to apply this theory in FHA cases, based on the Supreme Court’s
approval of it in Title VII employment-discrimination cases beginning
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co.369 By 2015, when the Court endorsed
disparate-impact claims under the FHA in Inclusive Communities,370
the lower courts had produced dozens of FHA decisions dealing with

366. See, e.g., Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 229–
31 (6th Cir. 2003) (familial status); Ventura Vill. Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis, 318 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824–26 (D. Minn. 2004) (disability).
367. See Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 830 F.2d 1420, 1424 (7th Cir. 1987);
Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 811–12 (3d
Cir. 1970).
368. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty.
Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *11–12 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2016).
369. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432–33 (1971). For early
appellate cases applying Griggs to the FHA, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
370. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
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this theory,371 and HUD had provided detailed guidance for it in a 2013
regulation.372
As the Inclusive Communities opinion noted, many of the FHA’s
disparate-impact cases—as the Court put it, those at the “heartland”
of this theory 373 —have involved challenges to local governments’
restrictions on housing proposals of particular value to racial
minorities.374 These “exclusionary zoning” cases—and how a source-ofincome amendment to the FHA would affect them—were discussed
earlier in Part IV.B,375 and similar issues involving home financing and
insurance were dealt with in Part IV.D.
Another type of disparate-impact claim that is likely to arise under
a FHA source-of-income amendment would be challenges to landlords’
requirements that prospective tenants have a certain minimum incometo-rent ratio (e.g., that their income be at least three times the rent).
This is a common type of tenant-screening requirement, and there is a
long history of its being targeted in FHA-impact claims that allege
racial discrimination.
Indeed, such a claim was involved in one of the earliest appellate
cases to consider Griggs’s applicability to the FHA. In Boyd v. Lefrak
Organization, 376 the defendant-landlord operated 119 buildings with
over 15,000 apartments and required applicants to have a weekly net
income of at least 90% of the monthly rent for their desired unit.377 A
371. See, e.g., id. at 2519 (noting the consensus among the federal appellate
courts that the FHA encompassed disparate-impact claims).
372. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500). For HUD’s recent proposed changes to its 2013 impact
regulation, see HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,857 (Aug. 19, 2019).
373. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22.
374. See id.; see also supra notes 301–304 and accompanying text.
375. See also supra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing similar issues
involving municipal restrictions on group homes for disabled people).
376. Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975).
377. Id. at 1111. As an alternative to satisfying this 90% rule, an applicant
could provide a co-signer whose weekly net income was equal to 110% of
the monthly rent. Id.
The defendants’ 90% rule appears to have been prompted by an earlier
FHA case in which they had been accused of racial discrimination by the
Justice Department in a “pattern and practice” suit. This suit ended in a
1971 consent decree that called for the defendants, inter alia, to use the
90% rule. Id. at 1112. This consent decree was later amended to allow
welfare recipients, in lieu of meeting the 90% rule, to provide a legally
enforceable guarantee by a government agency, but no such guarantee
was ever used. Id. at 1112 n.3.

641

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

class of black welfare recipients challenged this 90% rule on the ground
that it excluded a disproportionately high percentage of minorities.378
After a bench trial, the district judge, retired Supreme Court Justice
Tom Clark, ruled for the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants’ use of
the 90% rule, but a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed.379 The
majority held that the Griggs theory was “inapposite here,”380 and thus
a “private landlord in choosing his tenants is free to use any grounds
he likes so long as no discriminatory purpose is shown.”381

378. See id. at 1112 (describing the basis of plaintiffs’ claim as being that the
90% rule excludes most public assistance recipients and “that a large
majority of public assistance recipients in New York City are black or
Puerto Rican”).
379. Id. at 1111–12.
380. Id. at 1114 (calling plaintiffs’ reliance on Griggs “misplaced”); see also id.
at 1113 (concluding that a disparate-impact “analysis is inappropriate in
the context of a purely private action asserting a claim of racial
discrimination” under the FHA).
The dissent determined that “[t]his case should be governed by the
[Griggs] principle.” Id. at 1115 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield
noted that the evidence showed that defendants had a policy of not
renting to welfare recipients, and that their 90% rule had a
disproportionately high racial impact, given that 77% of all such recipients
in New York City “were minority persons.” Id. at 1117. He also noted
that white-household eligibility under the 90% rule “would be four times
as great as that of Black households and ten times as great as that of
Puerto Rican households.” Id. The dissent concluded that, although no
one questions either “the importance to a landlord of a prospective
tenant’s payment of rent” or that a landlord “may adopt reasonably
appropriate economic standards or tests designed to assure the tenant’s
future ability to pay rent on an on-going basis,” defendants had failed to
show that the 90% rule “was reasonably necessary to insure tenants’
payment of rent . . . [or] that welfare recipients as tenants have a greater
incidence of rent failures or defaults than other tenants.” Id. at 1116, 1118.
Indeed, the evidence showed that a “welfare recipient’s ability to
pay . . . is not properly measurable by his or her aggregate income” and
that, unknown to defendants, hundreds of welfare recipients actually lived
in their apartments, which suffered few rent defaults. Id. at 1118. Based
on this evidence, Judge Mansfield concluded that Griggs “mandates
affirmance of the district court’s decision.” Id.
381. Id. at 1114 (majority opinion). According to the majority:
A businessman’s differential treatment of different economic
groups is not necessarily racial discrimination and is not made so
because minorities are statistically overrepresented in the poorer
economic groups. The fact that differentiation in eligibility rates
for defendants’ apartments is correlated with race proves merely
that minorities tend to be poorer than is the general population.
Id. at 1113.
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By the late 1980s, however, the Second Circuit, along with other
courts of appeals, had come to accept the discriminatory-effect theory’s
applicability to the FHA. 382 Thus, in 1989, a district court in New
York 383 felt free to, and did, approve an impact-based challenge by
black applicants against a landlord’s requirement that tenants have
income equal to at least three times the rent.384 As discussed above, the
Bronson court also enjoined the defendant-landlord’s “No Section 8”
policy because it found that the policy had an unjustified racial impact
and was perhaps prompted by racially discriminatory intent.385 But the
case's significance here is that the court independently determined that
the defendant’s “triple rent” policy ran afoul of FHA because of its
unjustified negative impact on racial minorities. 386 Later decisions,
however, provided a mixed response to impact-based challenges to “No
Section 8” policies based on racial discrimination,387 and few, if any,
subsequent plaintiffs brought this type of claim against a landlord’s
income-to-rent-ratio policy.388
382. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
934 (2d Cir.) (doubting Boyd’s continued validity while ruling in favor of
discriminatory-effect challenges to a municipality’s exclusionary-zoning
practices); see also supra notes 9, 371 (discussing other 1970s and 1980s
decisions).
383. Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
384. Id. at 154–56.
385. See supra notes 160, 232–233 and accompanying text.
386. In Bronson, the court found that defendant’s “triple income” requirement
resulted in a disparate impact because “non-minorities qualify [for
defendant’s complex] at a rate of more than twice that for minorities.”
724 F. Supp. at 154 (14% of minority households, compared to 28% of
non-minority households). As for the defendant’s justification, the court
noted that the FHA allows a landlord to seek “assurance that prospective
tenants will be able to meet their rental responsibilities.” Id. at 156
(quoting Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir. 1975)).
Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant failed to show its tripleincome policy was “reasonably necessary to insure payment of rent
or . . . [to avoid] losses or defaults.” Id. at 154.
387. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
388. Cf. supra notes 217–225 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth
Circuit’s endorsement of a reasonable-accommodation challenge to a
landlord’s triple-income requirement).
In 1991, the California Supreme Court interpreted California’s Unruh
Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code § 51 (2016), to not bar a landlord’s
requirement that prospective tenants have gross monthly incomes of at
least three times the rent, both because such a requirement was not a
form of arbitrary economic discrimination and because the Unruh Act did
not include a disparate-impact standard (thus defeating plaintiff’s claim
that the triple-income requirement had an unlawful impact on women).
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How would such claims fare under a FHA amended to outlaw
source-of-income discrimination? Clearly, such a law would prohibit
landlords from having “No Section 8” or “No Welfare” policies.389 But
would such an amendment also support an impact-based challenge to a
landlord’s income-to-rent-ratio requirement? The answer will likely
depend—as it does with FHA-impact claims generally—on the specific
statistical proof offered by the plaintiff and the defendant’s proferred
justifications for its policy.
For example, in Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC,390 the Chicago Com–
mission on Human Relations approved the theory of an impact-based
challenge by a Section 8 voucher holder to a landlord’s requirement
that prospective tenants have a rent-to-income ratio of 34% or less,391
but ultimately held that the proof of disparate impact was in–
adequate.392 This case was complicated by the fact that the landlord
accepted some voucher holders (e.g., those with a guarantor who met
the “34% rule”), making it difficult for the complainant to produce data
about how this policy impacted voucher holders.393 But even accepting
the complainant’s view that the landlord’s “minimum-income require–
See Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 878–81, 893 (Cal.
1991). A year later, the state legislature amended the Unruh Act to allow
disparate-impact claims in some circumstances, and in 1999, it amended
the state’s fair-housing law to ban source-of-income discrimination.
See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 627–28 (Cal. 2009); infra
app. I.
389. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text.
390. CCHR No. 14-H-61 (May 11, 2017).
391. Id. at 11–13. The CCHR distinguished two earlier decisions—Boyd v.
Parkview Mgmt. Corp., CCHR No. 10-H-48 (June 18, 2013), and Jackson
v. Wilmette Realty, CCHR No. 99-H-32 (Sept. 27, 1999)—in which it had
rejected challenges to similar income-to-rent-ratio requirements brought
by Social Security recipients. Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 11–13.
According to the CCHR, the analysis of minimum-income requirements
differs depending on whether the applicant’s source of income is Social
Security or the voucher program, because:
The Housing Choice voucher covers a portion, and in some cases
all, of the recipient’s rent, which is cash income. Therefore, the
property owner can reasonably expect that any income in addition
to the voucher can be used to cover the obligations of tenancy and
living expenses. On the other hand, Social Security benefits are
cash income paid to the recipient. Thus, if a rental applicant does
not have income sufficient to cover the obligations of tenancy and
the rent, a property owner can reasonably refuse to rent to that
applicant.
Boyd, CCHR No. 10-H-48, at 3.
392. Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 13–15, 18.
393. Id. at 15-17, 17 n.12.
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ment would automatically exclude at least 75% of Chicago Voucher
holders if strictly applied,”394 the CCHR ruled that the evidence failed
to establish a disparate impact because it did not also show how this
requirement impacted “market rate applicants.” 395 Because a prima
facie case of disparate impact was not established, the CCHR did not
go on to address “the remaining questions of whether Respondents have
a business justification for their policy and—if so—whether a lessdiscriminatory alternative was available to achieve Respondents’
legitimate objectives.”396
Nibbs nicely demonstrates how impact-based challenges to
landlords’ income-to-rent-ratio policies, though proper in theory under
a law that prohibits source-of-income discrimination, will succeed or fail
depending on each case’s particular facts. Key facts include: whether
the landlord strictly enforces such a policy or allows exceptions to it;
the plaintiff’s ability to produce statistics showing that the landlord’s
policy has a greater adverse impact on government-assisted prospective
renters compared to those without government-assisted incomes; and
the alternatives available to the landlord to insure that those who fail
to meet its required ratio will still be able to meet their rental
obligations. The upshot is that this type of screening device may have
to be adjusted in some instances to avoid liability under an amended
FHA.397
394. Id. at 15.
395. Id. at 17. This gap, according to Nibbs, distinguished this case from
Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), which the CCHR seemed to accept as good law. See
Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 15–16.
396. Nibbs, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 18. In earlier cases, the CCHR had
recognized that landlords have some leeway In setting income-ratio
policies:
A property owner . . . may establish and enforce reasonable
policies as to the amount of income a potential tenant must have
in relation to the amount of rent . . . . [S]uch policies have the
legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose of assuring the property
owner that the prospective tenant of a dwelling unit will be able
to pay the rent.
Id. at 11–12 (quoting Jackson v. Wilmette Realty, CCHR No. 99-H-32, at
4 (Sept. 27, 1999)).
397. An analogous situation has played out in recent years involving landlords’
“No Criminal Record” screening rules. Those rules’ disparate racial impact
allegedly violates the FHA unless they are narrowed to more precisely
advance the landlord’s legitimate interest in quality tenants. See, e.g.,
Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle Towers Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 388 F. Supp.
3d 145, 172–77 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); Sams v. Ga. W. Gate, LLC, No. CV415282, 2017 WL 436281 at *1–2, *5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2017); see also
Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia, HOME Settles
Race Discrimination Lawsuit Against Sterling Glen Apartments (Aug. 6,
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The FHA’s discriminatory-effect theory of liability may produce
other types of claims if the statute is amended to ban source-of-income
discrimination.398 In these situations, as well as the income-to-rent-ratio
cases, it is worth noting that a landlord’s continued articulation and
enforcement of a policy that has a discriminatory effect can also run
afoul of the statute’s prohibition against discriminatory notices and
statements,399 and can ultimately be the target of serious sanctions.400
3. Gentrification

A major fair-housing issue in recent years has been “gentrification,”
which refers to the movement of middle-class, mostly white residents
into city neighborhoods whose residents, before this influx, were
predominantly low-income minorities.401 In terms of racial movement,
gentrification is the opposite of the old “changing neighborhood”
2019) (describing settlement of such a case in which the defendantlandlord agreed to a less restrictive policy, limited to “relevant criminal
background screening” for “specific categories of offenses”), available at
https://homeofva.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/190806-NR-SterlingGlen-settlement-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH5U-ASAT].
398. See, e.g., Fulk v. Lee, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 375 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)
(holding that landlord’s refusal to rent to Section 8 voucher user “because
she had no employment” violated Connecticut’s source-of-income law,
because “[b]y rejecting her on the basis that she had no employment, the
defendants accomplished indirectly what they could not do directly”); see
also Cohen v. Monroe Cty., 749 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2018) (rejecting
FHA disability-discrimination claim challenging the county’s requirement
that 70% of resident’s current income must derive from local
employment).
399. See supra Part IV.C.
400. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Ctr. of Wash. v. Breier-Scheetz Props., LLC, No.
C16-922 TSZ, 2019 WL 1987055, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 6, 2019)
(imposing civil-contempt sanctions based on landlords’ continued use of
occupancy restrictions after earlier ruling that the restrictions violated the
FHA based on their disparate impact on families with children).
401. See NYU Furman Ctr., How NYCHA Preserves Diversity in New
York’s Changing Neighborhoods 9 (2019) (describing “gentrifying
neighborhoods” as those that were “low-income in 1990 and experienced
rent growth above the median SBA rent growth between 1990 and 2010–
2014,” and identifying fifteen of New York City’s twenty-two low-income
neighborhoods in 1990 as currently gentrifying), available at https://
furmancenter.org/files/NYCHA_Diversity_Brief_Final_4-30-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97QE-55WQ]; see also Ingrid Gould Ellen & Gerard
Torrats-Espinosa, Gentrification and Fair Housing: Does Gentrification
Further Integration? 4 (Aug. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10511482
.2018.1524440) (labeling a census tract “as gentrifying if it experienced an
increase in the ratio of its median income to the median income of the
[Core-based Statistical Area] of at least 0.1 over a decade”).

646

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act

scenario that has existed for much the FHA’s history, in which blacks
move out of a city’s heavily minority areas into whiter, more affluent
communities.402
In one respect, gentrification advances a core goal of the FHA by
helping to integrate some city neighborhoods.403 But too often, critics
assert, this is accomplished by displacing minority families. Those
families are often unable to afford the rising rents and other costs
associated with this phenomenon, forcing them to leave communities
they have long called home, perhaps becoming homeless or having to
move to areas that are not only less familiar, but offer fewer
opportunities and, ultimately, a racially impacted demographic of their
own. 404 Thus, while few argue that gentrification can or should be
stopped, many advocate that government should try to reduce its
negative impact on the long-time residents of newly-gentrified-areas.405
The FHA has occasionally been invoked on behalf of families facing
displacement by gentrification, but with limited success. 406 To the
402. See Sander, supra note 44, at 873–74, 888.
403. See, e.g., Gould Ellen & Torrats-Espinosa, supra note 401, at 1, 8 (noting
that “gentrification . . . offers a glimmer of hope, as the moves that higherincome, white households make into predominantly minority, lower-income
neighborhoods are moves that help to integrate those neighborhoods, at
least in the near-term” and concluding that the “long-term picture
suggests that gentrification has spawned some stable, racially integrated
neighborhoods”); Lance Freeman, Creating Integrated Communities Is
More Than Preventing Displacement, in The Dream Revisited, supra
note 50, at 327, 327 (describing research showing that neighborhoods
experiencing gentrification in the 1980s and 1990s “were more diverse,
both in racial and ethnic terms and in terms of socioeconomic status, than
other central-city neighborhoods that did not experience gentrification”).
404. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Black, Poor, and Gone: Civil Rights Law’s
Inner-City Crisis, 54 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 629, 652–56 (2019);
Rachel D. Godsil, Transforming Gentrification Into Integration, in The
Dream Revisited, supra note 50, at 322, 322–23.
405. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 44, at 898–900; Freeman, supra note 403, at
327–29; Brad Lander, It Will Take More Than a Voucher, in The Dream
Revisited, supra note 50, at 330, 332–33; see also Alfieri, supra note 404,
at 698 (noting Richard Rothstein's assertion that “housing proposals for
segregated neighborhoods that purport to contribute to ‘revitalization’ must
be part of a concerted plan of revitalization that includes . . . preserving
affordability for those with moderate and lower incomes”) (quoting
Richard Rothstein, The Supreme Court’s Challenge to Housing
Segregation, Am. Prospect (July 5, 2015), https://prospect.org/article/
supreme-courts-challenge-housing-segregation [https://perma.cc/6E9F5ZVG]).
406. See Wadley v. Park at Landmark LP, 264 F. App’x 279, 280–82 (4th Cir.
2008) (affirming summary judgment against FHA-race claim based on
landlord’s decision to phase out its Section 8 tenants through non-renewal
of their leases so it could pursue market-rate tenants); Barry Farms
Tenants v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2018)
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extent that displacement can be ameliorated with the use of Section 8
vouchers or other government assistance for current residents,407 it is
possible that a source-of-income FHA amendment would add some
protection against the eviction of these residents by housing providers
intent upon “upgrading” their developments. The success of such
litigation would likely turn on the degree to which displaced tenants
are afforded sufficient relocation assistance so that they can maintain
comparable housing.408

Conclusion
The 1968 Fair Housing Act, last significantly amended in 1988, has
advanced the interests of countless minority home-seekers, but it has
fallen short in fulfilling its primary goal of reducing racial discrimination
and segregation. One reason for this is that the FHA allows housing
providers to discriminate against people who rely on Section 8 vouchers
and other forms of governmental assistance. Such source-of-income
discrimination not only undercuts the federal government’s principal
housing-assistance program, but it also disproportionately harms racial
minorities and other FHA-protected groups. A growing number of
states and localities have now addressed this problem by amending their
fair-housing laws to ban source-of-income discrimination. The time has
come for Congress to do the same.
This Article has reviewed the various state and local source-ofincome laws, as well as the FHA-impact cases that have challenged
(dismissing on ripeness grounds a FHA familial-status claim challenging
landlords’ plan to transform large public housing complex into a mixedincome community); cf. Crossroads Residents v. MSP Crossroads
Apartments LLC, No. CV 16-233 ADM/KMM, 2016 WL 3661146 (D.
Minn. July 5, 2016). See generally Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities?
Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair Housing Act, 53 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 835, 848–61 (2019) (concluding that “the FHA is an important but
limited tool for addressing the potential harms of gentrification”); Alfieri,
supra note 404, at 667–88 (surveying FHA litigation theory’s possible
responses to gentrification).
407. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 404, at 323 (arguing that cities undergoing
gentrification “should use rental vouchers or low-interest loans to restore
the autonomy of current residents”); NYU Furman Ctr., supra note
401, at 1 (describing how the availability of public housing helps maintain
diversity in gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City).
408. See City of Alameda v. FG Managing Member, Inc., No. C 04-04010
WHA, 2004 WL 2403848, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) (rejecting
California Fair Housing Act claim, which alleged that defendantlandlord’s renovation of a complex housing many Section 8 users had
caused a “loss of housing for minorities, disabled, and especially families
who rely on government rent subsidies,” primarily because all current
tenants, though temporarily displaced, were assured by the defendant that
they would be relocated); see also Crossroads Residents, 2016 WL
3661146, at *11.
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source-of-income discrimination because of its negative effect on the
FHA’s current protected classes. This review demonstrates some of the
advantages—and disadvantages—of adding source-of-income to the
FHA’s list of prohibited bases of discrimination. The Article has also
identified and analyzed the various types of FHA claims that are likely
to arise if such an amendment is adopted.
A source-of-income amendment, though not a panacea, would be
an important step forward in expanding housing opportunities for all,
in ending arbitrary limits on housing choice, and in helping the FHA
achieve its core mission of reducing segregation. Such an amendment is
the next logical step in the evolution of the FHA, an Act whose ultimate
measure of success depends on how much it can reduce the longentrenched patterns of residential segregation that continue to divide
the nation.
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Appendix I
State Laws Outlawing Housing Discrimination Based on Source-ofIncome

[year enacted in brackets]
California: CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 [1999]: “source of income”
made part of state’s fair housing law and defined in subsec. (p)(1) as
meaning “lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to
a representative of a tenant.” This definition was amended in 2019 to
include Section 8 vouchers and other government assistance “paid to a
housing owner or landlord on behalf of a tenant.”
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes
98 and 119-20 and accompanying text; see also supra note 388 (dealing
with California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51-52).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c [1989]: “lawful
source of income” regarding housing transactions made part of state’s
public accommodations law in 1989 and, in 1990, made part of state’s
fair housing law (which uses prohibitory language that is virtually
identical to the federal FHA) and defining, in § 46a-63(3), “‘Lawful
source of income’ as meaning “income derived from Social Security,
supplemental security income, housing assistance, child support,
alimony or public or state-administered general assistance.”
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes
99, 104, 112-13, 116, and 242 and accompanying text).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603(b) [2016]: “source of
income” added to five prohibitions of state’s fair housing law and
defined to mean “any lawful source of money paid directly, indirectly,
or on behalf of a renter or buyer of housing including: . . . (b) Income
or rental payments derived from any government or private assistance,
grant, or loan program.” § 4602(25).
– allows landlords not to accept vouchers (§ 4607(j)): “A landlord
is not required to participate in any government-sponsored rental
assistance program, voucher, or certificate system. A landlord’s
nonparticipation in any government-sponsored rental assistance
program, voucher, or certificate system may not serve as the basis for
any administrative or judicial proceeding under this chapter.”
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581-A [1975]: in separate
provision from state fair housing law’s main prohibitions; (4): “Receipt
of public assistance. For any person furnishing rental premises or public
accommodations to refuse to rent or impose different terms of tenancy
to any individual who is a recipient of federal, state or local public
assistance, including medical assistance and housing subsidies,
primarily because of the individual’s status as recipient.”
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– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes
102, 105, and 111.
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-705 [2020]: “source
of income” made part of state’s fair housing law and defined to mean
“any lawful source of money paid directly or indirectly to or on behalf
of a renter or buyer of housing [including income from any] government
or private assistance, grant, loan, or rental assistance program,
including low-income housing assistance certificates and vouchers issued
under the United States Housing Act of 1937.” § 20-701(j).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4.10 [1971]: limited
to rental accommodations (not part of state’s main fair housing law),
which, as amended in 1990, provides:
It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or any person furnishing
credit, services or rental accommodations to discriminate against
any individual who is a recipient of federal, state, or local public
assistance, including medical assistance, or who is a tenant
receiving federal, state, or local housing subsidies, including rental
assistance or rental supplements, because the individual is such a
recipient, or because of any requirement of such public assistance,
rental assistance, or housing subsidy program.

– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes
104, 106-11, and 172-73 and accompanying text.
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.09 subd. 1 [1990]: “status
with regard to public assistance” made part of state’s civil rights laws
and defined as meaning “the condition of being a recipient of federal,
state, or local assistance, including medical assistance, or of being a
tenant receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including rental
assistance or rent supplements.” § 363A.03 subd. 47.
– this provision and cases dealing with it are discussed supra notes
97 and 227 and accompanying text.
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12g [1981 (covers
vouchers); amended in 2002 to add “source of lawful income used for
rental or mortgage payments” to state’s civil rights laws]:
10:5-4: All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain
employment, and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation,
publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property
without discrimination because of race, . . . or source of lawful
income used for rental or mortgage payments, subject only to
conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
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10:5-12g. For any person, including but not limited to, any owner,
lessee, sublessee, assignee or managing agent of, or other person
having the right of ownership or possession of or the right to sell,
rent, lease, assign, or sublease any real property or part or portion
thereof, or any agent or employee of any of these:
(1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease, assign, or sublease or otherwise
to deny to or withhold from any person or group of persons any
real property or part or portion thereof because of race, . . . or
source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments.

– these provisions and cases dealing with them are discussed supra
notes 99, 104, 116, and 238 and accompanying text.
New York: N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.2-a(a)-(e) [2019]: “source of
income” added to state’s fair housing law applicable to rental accom–
modations:
2-a. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner,
lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of publicly-assisted
housing accommodations or other person having the right of
ownership or possession of or the right to rent or lease such
accommodations:
(a) To refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or
withhold from any person or group of persons such housing
accommodations because of the race, . . . lawful source of
income or familial status of such person or persons . . . .

North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-02.5.02(1)-(2) [1999]:
“status with regard to . . . public assistance” added to state’s fair
housing law and defined to mean “the condition of being a recipient of
federal, state, or local assistance, including medical assistance, or of
being a tenant receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including
rental assistance or rent supplements” (§ 14-02.4-02 (19)).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1452.A.8 [1985]: not part
of state’s main fair housing prohibitions; makes it unlawful “To refuse
to consider as a valid source of income any public assistance, alimony,
or child support, awarded by a court, when that source can be verified
as to its amount, length of time received, regularity, or receipt because
of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, familial status, or
handicap.”
Oregon: OR. STAT. ANN. § 659A.421(2)-(6) [1995; 2013 amendment
deleted exemption for vouchers]: “source of income” made a part of
state’s fair housing law and now defined to include Section 8 vouchers
and
any
other
government
“housing
assistance”
in
§ 659A.421(1)(d)(A).
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Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5 [1993]: “source of income”
defined to mean “the verifiable condition of being a recipient of federal,
state, or local assistance, including medical assistance, or of being a
tenant receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including rental
assistance or rent supplements.” § 57-21-2(24).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1 [2020]: “source of funds” made
part of state’s fair housing law and defined to mean “any source that
lawfully provides funds to or on behalf of a renter or buyer of housing,
including any assistance, benefit, or subsidy program, whether such
program is administered by a governmental or nongovernmental
entity.” § 36-96.1.1.
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(a) [1987]: “because a
person is a recipient of public assistance” added to state’s fair housing
law; not defined.
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18 [2018]: prohibits discrim–
ination by landlords based on a tenant’s source-of-income (defined to
include subsidy programs) using prohibitory language similar to the
FHA’s.
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.50(1) [1980]: “lawful source of
income” added to state’s fair housing law, but not defined in the statute
(definition in state administrative regulations include “public
assistance” and any “coupon or voucher representing monetary value
such as food stamps” (Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 202.02(8))).
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Appendix II
Selected Local Laws Outlawing Housing Discrimination Based on Sourceof-Income409

[year enacted in brackets]
Austin, Texas: AUSTIN ORD. NO. 20141211–050 [2014]; invalidated
by subsequent state law.
Boston, Massachusetts: BOS. MUN. CODE § 10-3.1 [1982]: amends
the City’s fair housing code to prohibit housing discrimination on the
basis of “source of income.”
Chicago, Illinois: CHI. MUN. CODE § 5-8-030 § 5-8-030 (basic
prohibition), -040 (definition of “source of income”) [1990].
Cook County, Illinois: COOK CNTY. CODE § 42-38(b) [2013]: fair
housing law (§ 42-30 et seq.) amended to bar discrimination based on
housing-choice-voucher status.
Dallas, Texas: DALL. CITY CODE Vol. 1, Ch. 20A [2016]; invalidated
by subsequent state law.
Denver, Colorado: DEN. REV. MUN. CODE Ch. 3, Art. IV, § 28-95
[2018].
Los Angeles City, California: L.A. MUN. CODE Ch. IV Sec. 1 Art.
5.6.1 [2019]: prohibits rental discrimination based on source of income
(Sec. 45.67) and defines “source of income” to include “the Section 8
voucher program . . . or any other housing subsidy program, homeless
assistance or prevention program or security deposit assistance
program.” (Sec. 45.66)
Los Angeles County, California: L.A. CNTY. CODE OF ORD.S Ch.
858 [2019]: prohibits rental discrimination based on source of income
(Sec. 8.58.030) and defines “source of income” to include the Section 8
Housing Choice Vouchers program and other government-funded rental
assistance programs (Sec. 8.58.020).
Miami-Dade County, Florida: MIAMI-DADE CNTY. CODE OF ORD.S
§ 11A-12 [2009].
409. The jurisdictions listed here are those with the largest populations (e.g.,
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago) and those that have produced cases
discussed elsewhere in this Article. For a full list of the places with such
laws, see Poverty & Race Research Action Council, supra note 84,
at app. B.
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Memphis, Tennessee: MEMPHIS CODE OF ORD.S § 10-36 [2002].
Milwaukee, Wisconsin: MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORD.S Ch. 109
[2018].
Minneapolis, Minnesota: MINN. CODE OF ORD.S Tit. 7, Ch. 139
[2017].
Montgomery County, Maryland: MONTGOMERY CNTY. CODE Part
II, Ch. 27, Art. I [1991].
New York City, New York: N.Y.C. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW §§ 8107(5)(a)(1)+(3) [2008]: defines “lawful source of income” as including
“without limitation income derived from social security, or any form of
federal, state or local public assistance or housing assistance including
section 8 vouchers.”
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: PHILA. CODE, FAIR HOUSING ORD. Ch.
9-800 [1980]: making it illegal for landlords to discriminate against
tenants because of their source of income.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: PITTS. CODE OF ORD.S Tit. Six, Art. V,
Ch. 659.03 [2015].
San Diego, California: SAN DIEGO MUN. CODE Ch. 9, Art. 8, Div.
8 [2018]: “source of income” added to city’s fair housing ordinance and
defined to include government rent subsidies.
San Francisco, California: S.F. POLICE CODE § 3304, subd. (a)
[1998]: “source of income” added to city’s fair housing ordinance and
defined to include government rent subsidies.
St. Louis, Missouri: ST. LOUIS CITY ORD. Title 3 Ch. 44 Sec.
3.44.080 [2015]: “Source of income” means the point or form of the
origination of legal gains of income accruing to a person in a stated
period of time; from any occupation, profession or activity, from any
contract, agreement or settlement, from federal, state or local
payments, including Section 8 or any other rent subsidy or rent
assistance program, from court ordered payments or from payments
received as gifts, bequests, annuities or life insurance policies.”
(Sec.344.010).
Seattle, Washington: SEATTLE MUN. CODE Tit. 14, Ch. 14.08
[1989].
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Washington, D.C.: D.C. CODE § 2–1402.21(a), § 2–1401.02(29):
1997: added “source of income” to local fair housing law (which makes
it unlawful to discriminate “wholly or partially for a discriminatory
reason based on [identified factors]”) and defined to “source of income”
include “federal payments”; 2002: amended to expressly include HCV
program assistance within law’s “source of income” (D.C.Code § 42–
2851.06); 2005: technical amendments to correct an error that had
applied this provision to public accommodations rather than to private
housing (D.C.Code § 2–1402.21(e))]: this provision and cases dealing
with it are discussed supra notes 100, 116, 259, and 261.
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Appendix III
Proposed Source-of-Income Amendments to the Fair Housing Act

2019:
American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2019, S. 787,
116th Cong. § 301 (2019) (Senator Warren and others), and H.R. 1737,
116th Cong. § 301 (2019) (Rep.s Richmond and others): adds source of
income and three other protected classes (sexual orientation, gender
identify, and marital status) to the FHA; “‘Source of income’ includes
income for which there is a reasonable expectation that the income will
continue from—
“(1) a profession, occupation or job;
“(2) any government or private assistance, grant, loan or rental
assistance program, including low-income housing assistance certificates
and vouchers issued under the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42
U.S.C. 1437 et seq.);
“(3) a gift, an inheritance, a pension, an annuity, alimony, child
support, or other consideration or benefit; or
“(4) the sale or pledge of property or an interest in property.”
**
Landlord Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 232, 116th Cong. (2019)
(Rep. Velazquez): adds new subsection (g) to § 3604 outlawing rentalonly discrimination because “tenant is the holder of a housing voucher.”
**
Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2019, S. 1986, 116th Cong. (2019)
(Senators Kaine and Rosen), and H.R. 3516, 116th Cong. (2019) (Rep.s
Peters and others): adds source of income and military status as
protected classes under the FHA; defines, in Sec. 2(a)(1)(q), “source of
income” to include—
“(1) a housing voucher under section 8 of the United States Housing
Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f) and any form of Federal, State, or local
housing assistance provided to a family or provided to a housing owner
on behalf of a family, including rental vouchers, rental assistance, and
rental subsidies from nongovernmental organizations;
“(2) income received during a taxable year as Social Security
benefits, as defined in section 86(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, or as supplemental security income benefits under title XVI of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.);
“(3) income received by court order, including spousal support and
child support;
“(4) any payment from a trust, guardian, or conservator; and
“(5) any other lawful source of income.”
**
A Just Society: A Place to Prosper Act of 2019, H.R. 5072, 116th Cong.
§ 4 (2019) (Rep.s Ocasio-Cortez and others): adds source of income as
a protected class to the FHA; provides, in Sec. 4(a)(1), the same
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definition of “source of income” as in S. 1986 (Kaine and Rosen) and
H.R. 3516 (Peters and others) supra.
Before 2019:
American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2018, S. 3503,
115th Cong. § 301 (2018) (Senator Warren), and H.R. 7262, 115th
Cong. § 301 (Dec. 11, 2018) (Rep. Richmond and others) (see “2019”
above for description).
**
Landlord Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 202, 115th Cong. (2017),
and H.R. 5401, 114th Cong. (2016) (Rep. Velazquez) (see “2019” above
for description).
**
Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2018, S. 3612, 115th Cong. sec.
2(p) (2018) (Senators Hatch and Kaine): virtually identical to Senator
Kaine’s S. 1986 (see “2019” above for description).
**
Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act of 2013, S. 1242,
113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (Senator Brown and others): adds source of
income and three other protected classes (sexual orientation, gender
identify, and marital status) to the FHA; “‘Source of income’ means
the receipt of Federal, State, or local public assistance including medical
assistance, or the receipt by a tenant or applicant of Federal, State, or
local housing subsidies, including rental assistance under section 8 of
the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f) or other rental
assistance or rental supplements.”
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